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The Legislative Veto in Illinois: Why JCAR Review 
of Agency Rulemaking Is Unconstitutional 
Marc D. Falkoff* 
This Article argues that legislative vetoes of administrative agency 
rulemaking in Illinois are unlawful under the state’s constitution.  It 
focuses on the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (“JCAR”), a 
bipartisan legislative committee that is authorized to review rules 
promulgated by administrative agencies in the executive branch.  Since 
2004, JCAR has possessed veto power over agency rulemaking, 
meaning that the committee may permanently stop implementation of 
new rules upon the vote of three-fifths of its twelve members.  For even 
longer, the Illinois General Assembly has been authorized to block 
implementation of agency rules through passage of joint resolutions, 
which do not require presentment to the Governor for a potential 
executive veto.  The Illinois courts have not yet ruled on the 
constitutionality of the legislative veto, though it has been part of the 
state’s legal landscape since 1981.  Legislative veto schemes have been 
challenged in the federal system and in more than a dozen states.  In 
every instance except one, the schemes have been deemed 
unconstitutional violations of separation-of-powers principles, or else 
have been struck down for failing to comply with constitutional 
bicameralism or presentment requirements, or both.  No scheme that 
grants veto power to a committee of the legislature has ever been 
upheld as constitutional in any jurisdiction in the United States. 
The lack of judicial resolution of the lawfulness of the legislative veto 
in Illinois should not be taken to mean the scheme is uncontroversial in 
the state.  Indeed, it is little appreciated that Illinois recently 
experienced a constitutional crisis related to JCAR vetoes.  One of the 
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articles of impeachment against former Governor Rod Blagojevich 
alleged that he violated separation-of-powers principles by ordering 
one of his administrative agencies to refuse to comply with a JCAR veto 
of its rules.  Blagojevich was removed from office in part because of his 
refusal to accept the constitutionality of the legislative veto.  This 
Article argues that in fact the provisions of the Illinois Administrative 
Procedure Act that authorize JCAR and the General Assembly to veto 
agency rulemaking are inconsistent with the separation-of-powers and 
enactment provisions of the Illinois Constitution.  As such, the General 
Assembly should consider alternatives to the legislative veto now, 
before the Illinois courts rule the current system unconstitutional and 
throw the state’s rulemaking process into disarray. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that legislative vetoes of administrative agency 
rulemaking in Illinois are unlawful under the state’s constitution.  Since 
2004, a small committee of twelve legislators—the Joint Committee on 
Administrative Rules (“JCAR”)—has exercised statutory authority to 
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kill rules and regulations promulgated by executive branch agencies.  
For even longer, the General Assembly has held the same powers.1  
Although legislative vetoes were long ago held unconstitutional in the 
federal system,2 and have likewise been ruled unlawful in nearly every 
state in which they have been challenged in court,3 the Illinois courts 
have not yet ruled on their constitutionality under Illinois law. 
When the day of reckoning comes, the Illinois Supreme Court will 
have to decide whether JCAR and General Assembly vetoes accord 
with separation-of-powers principles4 and whether they comply with the 
state constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.5  The 
time for judicial resolution of these important questions is long overdue.  
The state of Illinois has already experienced something of a 
constitutional crisis because the courts have offered no guidance on the 
lawfulness of legislative vetoes.  In 2009, Governor Rod Blagojevich 
was impeached, convicted, and removed from office in part because the 
General Assembly found that he had violated separation-of-powers 
principles by ordering one of his administrative agencies to disregard a 
JCAR veto of its rules.6  The Governor’s rationale for his order was, of 
course, that legislative vetoes like those issued by JCAR were 
themselves unconstitutional on the same grounds. 
When JCAR was created in an overhaul of the Illinois Administrative 
Procedures Act (“IAPA”) in 1977, it was designed as an oversight 
committee with only modest powers.7  Broadly speaking, the function 
of JCAR was to oversee the activities of the state’s burgeoning 
administrative agencies, which the General Assembly had increasingly 
tasked with promulgating rules to effectuate the legislature’s laws.  As 
was happening in the federal government and in states across the nation, 
the Illinois legislature was seeking a way to retain some kind of 
meaningful control over rulemaking authority that, in the interests of 
efficiency, it had delegated to executive agencies. 
 
1. Since 1981, the General Assembly has been authorized by statute to block the 
implementation of agency rules by passing a joint resolution to make permanent JCAR rule 
suspensions.  See Act of Jan. 1, 1981, Pub. Act 81-1514, 1977 Ill. Laws 3898, discussed infra 
Part I.C. 
2. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953–54 (1983), discussed infra Part II.A. 
3. See infra Part II.B. 
4. See infra Part III.A. 
5. See infra Part III.B. 
6. The Blagojevich impeachment is discussed more fully below.  See infra notes 15–32 and 
accompanying text. 
7. See Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. Act 79-1083, 1975 Ill. Laws 3312. 
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As discussed in more detail in Part I below, JCAR was at first 
authorized to do little more than keep tabs on agency rulemaking.  The 
committee was to review newly proposed rules, consult with the 
promulgating agencies when it had concerns about the rules, and 
recommend legislative action to the General Assembly if informal 
discussion with the agencies failed to allay its concerns.  Though JCAR 
could register its discontent with rules and regulations proposed by 
agencies, neither the General Assembly nor JCAR had authority to 
unilaterally keep those rules from going into effect. 
By its own account, JCAR’s “inform-and-advise” authority was 
initially effective, and had a substantial impact on agency rulemaking.8  
But almost immediately JCAR sought more power over agency 
rulemaking for both itself and the General Assembly.  In 1980, the 
General Assembly passed into law (over a gubernatorial veto) a statute 
that authorized JCAR to suspend operation of new agency rules by a 
three-fifths vote of the committee, and for the General Assembly to 
make the suspension permanent by passage of a joint resolution.9 
Thereafter, anytime JCAR expressed unease about a new rule, the 
administrative agency that promulgated it would endeavor to allay 
JCAR’s concerns in order to lessen the likelihood of a General 
Assembly veto.  According to JCAR’s Annual Report for 1981, during 
the first year in which the veto was available to the General Assembly, 
“virtually all” of the rules that JCAR reviewed were modified by the 
promulgating agencies in response to JCAR comments.10 
In 2004, JCAR was granted statutory authority to issue its own 
veto.11  Pursuant to amendments to the IAPA, a JCAR objection and 
suspension of a proposed rule would no longer expire if the General 
Assembly failed to pass a joint resolution making the suspension 
permanent.12  Instead, a JCAR suspension would become permanent 
 
8. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 17–18 (1979) [hereinafter 1978 JCAR REPORT] (noting that in its first functioning 
year, JCAR reviewed nearly five hundred proposed agency rules, found “serious problems” with 
more than one-third of them, but informal discussion and the threat of corrective legislation had 
led to the resolution of most of the committee’s concerns).  All of JCAR annual reports are now 
accessible online at INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/ (search in search bar for “Illinois 
Joint Committee on Administrative Rules Annual Report”) (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
9. Act of Jan. 1, 1981, Pub. Act 81-1514, 1977 Ill. Laws 3898. 
10. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 110 (1982) [hereinafter 1981 JCAR REPORT]. 
11. 100 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115(c) (2016). 
12. Id. 
15_FALKOFF FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  12:48 PM 
2016] Legislative Veto in Illinois 1059 
 
unless the General Assembly passed a joint resolution overriding it.13  
The effect was to turn a General Assembly veto (which at least had the 
virtues of requiring bicameral majority support) into a legislative 
committee veto that could be exercised by a group of just eight 
legislators (three-fifths of the twelve-member body).14 
Both forms of legislative veto—the one possessed solely by the 
General Assembly until 2004 and the one possessed by JCAR since 
then—raise serious questions about whether separation-of-powers 
principles are being respected in the state and about whether the 
exercise of such vetoes is in accord with Illinois constitutional 
requirements for the enactment of laws.  The constitutional concerns 
raised by the veto power, although long simmering without resolution, 
are of deep importance to the state and have in fact already resulted in a 
largely unnoticed constitutional crisis. 
It is widely known that in 2009 Governor Rod Blagojevich was 
impeached, convicted, and removed from office by the General 
Assembly following allegations he had, in the words of the House of 
Representatives’ Article of Impeachment, sought “to obtain a personal 
benefit in exchange for his appointment to fill [Barack Obama’s] vacant 
seat in the United States Senate.”15  Less appreciated is that one of the 
particular articles against Blagojevich included the charge he had 
“abused the power of his office” by his “refusal to recognize the 
authority of the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules to suspend or 
prohibit rules, [and] his utter disregard of the doctrine of separation of 
powers.”16  Given the doubtful constitutionality of the state’s legislative 
veto scheme, the accusation was ironic in the extreme. 
The contretemps arose after the Illinois Department of Health and 
 
13. Id. 
14. A JCAR suspension of a rule still requires a three-fifths vote of the committee.  Id. 
15. H.R. Res. 5, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at art. I(1) (Ill. 2008).  Governor Blagojevich 
was also tried in federal court on charges related to wire fraud, attempted extortion, conspiracy to 
commit extortion, soliciting bribes, and conspiracy to solicit and accept bribes.  Summary of 
Charges at 72, United States v. Blagojevich, No. 08-CR-888 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2011).  He was 
initially convicted on one count in August 2010, with the jury deadlocked on the remaining 
twenty-four.  Bob Secter et al., Blagojevich Convicted on 1 of 24 Counts, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 
2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-08-18/news/ct-met-blagojevich-verdict-2010081 
71_attorney-reid-schar-lone-conviction-sam-adam.  Upon retrial, he was convicted of another 
seventeen counts.  Monica Davey & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Jury Finds Blagojevich Guilty of 
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A1.  In July 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit vacated the convictions on five counts and affirmed the remaining convictions.  
United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 743 (7th Cir. 2015). 
16. Ill. Res. 5, at art. I(9). 
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Family Services (“Family Services”) issued a set of emergency rules 
raising the cut-off rate for Medicaid eligibility in the state to 400% of 
the federal poverty level.17  The agency, relying on the Illinois Public 
Aid Code,18 had promulgated the rules in part because of concern that a 
generous federal reimbursement program for a different state insurance 
program—the Children’s Health Insurance Protection Act19—would 
soon be discontinued. 
The IAPA required that the rules from Family Services be submitted 
to JCAR for review.20  JCAR objected to the rules, and suspended their 
implementation, on the grounds that there was no pending emergency 
and that the rules were contrary to the public interest.21  The Secretary 
of State accordingly refused to publish them.22 
With the consent of Governor Blagojevich, Family Services ignored 
JCAR suspension, sued the Secretary of State to force him to publish 
the rules, and put the rules into effect.23  A taxpayer suit soon followed, 
in which the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent implementation 
of the agency’s rule and a cessation of the enrollment of adults into 
Medicaid under the new eligibility standard.24 
Neither the trial court nor the intermediate appellate court reached the 
question of whether a General Assembly veto would have been 
constitutional had it been issued, nor did they determine whether the 
temporary suspension of the Medicaid rules that resulted from JCAR’s 
objection raised constitutional concerns.  Instead, the courts concluded 
that Family Services had misconstrued the Illinois Public Aid Code and 
did not have the statutory authority to promulgate rules expanding 
insurance coverage to the degree that it had attempted.25  It is 
impossible to know whether the Illinois Supreme Court would have 
reached the “legislative veto” questions that hovered in this matter, 
 
17. The facts of the dispute are taken from Caro ex rel. State v. Blagojevich, 895 N.E.2d 1091, 
1094–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
18. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2(2)(b) (2016). 
19. State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa–1397jj (2012). 
20. Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1 to 110/15-10 (2016). 
21. Caro, 895 N.E.2d at 1095. 
22. Id. 
23. See Associated Press, Blagojevich Ups Ante in Dispute with Lawmakers, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 3, 2008, at C4 (“The governor’s Department of Healthcare and Family Services 
has filed a suit to force Secretary of State Jesse White, a fellow Democrat, to publish rules 
allowing the expansion of the state’s Family Care program for Illinoisans who can’t afford private 
insurance.”). 
24. Caro, 895 N.E.2d at 1095. 
25. Id. at 1095–96 (discussing the trial court’s rulings). 
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because the case was settled by then-Governor Patrick Quinn soon after 
Blagojevich was removed from office.26 
The ultimate fate of the rules on Medicaid eligibility is of less 
concern for purposes of this Article than the fact that impeachment 
charges were filed against Blagojevich because of the dispute, which 
was arguably more about the political advisability of expanding 
Medicaid coverage than about the authority of Family Services to issue 
the rules in the first place.27  Hidden in plain sight, the General 
Assembly and the Governor were engaged in a battle royale over 
whether legislative vetoes of executive agency activity were lawful. 
Governor Blagojevich addressed the charge that he had disregarded 
separation-of-powers principles during his trial before the Senate.  He 
noted that nine other states had committees like JCAR that were ruled 
unconstitutional.28  He stated that he had “respected” JCAR since he 
had been Governor, but that he understood JCAR to be constitutionally 
limited to providing advice to the executive branch: 
But I’ve been given legal advice by lawyers and I believe they’re 
right, and other courts have agreed that those lawyers were right, that 
JCAR is an advisory committee, that it cannot dictate to the executive 
branch.  That if the executive branch seeks to do something, that 
committee can advise you and suggest whether it’s right or wrong, or 
they agree with you or not, but they can’t stop you.29 
Governor Blagojevich then explained how he viewed the separation-
of-powers equation playing out: 
 If you want to stop the executive branch under our Constitution and 
the ideas of separation of powers, then you all know how it works.  
The House passes a bill, you in the Senate pass a bill.  I may not like 
it.  You send it to me, I veto that bill, it goes back to you, and then you 
override my veto. 
 That’s how you stop the executive branch and a governor.  But 12 
lawmakers, however—however intelligent and honest and impressive 
and schooled as you may be, 12 lawmakers picked by a—by 
 
26. See John O’Connor, Quinn, Businessmen Settle Suit on Health Care, MY WEB TIMES 
(June 22, 2009), http://www.mywebtimes.com/news/illinois_ap/quinn-businessmen-settle-suit-on 
-health-care/article_189bcd7f-fbc8-53ba-ab38-00ed93d7fe6e.html. 
27. The position of the House of Representatives on the lawfulness of Governor Blagojevich’s 
refusal to respect JCAR objections to his agency’s rules can be found in the final report of the 
House’s special investigative committee concerning the Blagojevich impeachment.  See ILL. 
H.R., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE 29–36 (2009). 
28. See 4 S., Impeachment Tribunal Transcripts of Governor Rod R. Blagojevich, 96th Gen. 
Assemb., at 597 (Ill. Jan. 29. 2009) (statement of Governor Rod R. Blagojevich). 
29. Id. at 596. 
15_FALKOFF FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  12:48 PM 
1062 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
 
legislative leaders cannot constitutionally thwart the executive branch.  
Nine states have challenged this case, and in all nine states the right of 
the executive branch to do what it sought to do without the consent of 
JCAR was upheld.30 
Notwithstanding his arguments, Governor Blagojevich was in fact 
convicted of this charge (among others) by the Senate and removed 
from office.31  It may be that the Illinois Supreme Court will ultimately 
rule that the legislative veto is unconstitutional in the state, but in the 
meantime the General Assembly has done more than shoot across the 
bow at the executive branch.32  It has already scored a direct hit and 
taken its first victim. 
In this Article, I argue that the current JCAR rules-review scheme, 
which allows the small committee to veto agency regulations, is almost 
surely going to be deemed unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme 
Court when the issue is squarely presented in an appropriate case.  
There is no way to predict when the issue will present itself to the high 
court.  Political considerations, for example, may persuade a sitting 
Governor against challenging JCAR’s authority, as the impeachment 
proceedings against Governor Blagojevich suggest.  And standing 
issues may impede access to the courts for persons or corporations who 
believe they have been harmed by the failure of an agency to follow 
through with proposed regulations.  But eventually the issue will be 
before the court, and an academic treatment of the legislative veto’s 
legitimacy in Illinois, one of its last redoubts, is long overdue.33 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the origins and 
evolving powers of JCAR since its creation by statute in 1977.  Over the 
course of several decades, JCAR has grown from an inform-and-advise 
body to a committee that can kill agency regulations by a vote of eight 
of its twelve members.  Part II surveys legal challenges to legislative 
veto schemes in the federal and state governments.  With one exception, 
 
30. Id. at 596–97. 
31. S., Judgment of Conviction and Disqualification, In the Matter of the Impeachment of Rod 
R. Blagojevich, Governor of the State of Illinois, 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. Jan. 29, 2009). 
32. Although the public may not have focused on the article of impeachment relating to JCAR 
and the legislative veto, the legislators did.  See, e.g., H.R., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen. 
Assemb., 7th Sess., at 9 (Ill. Feb. 4, 2009) (statement of Rep. Black) (“You just removed a 
Governor because he said, I don’t care what the rules are.  I don’t care what JCAR says, I’m not 
going to do that.”). 
33. The constitutionality of legislative vetoes in other states have been the subject of much 
scholarly attention.  See Kenneth D. Dean, Legislative Veto of Administrative Rules in Missouri: 
A Constitutional Virus, 57 MO. L. REV. 1157, 1157 n.9 (1992) (listing academic articles). 
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every court to have reviewed the constitutionality of legislative vetoes 
over rules promulgated by administrative agencies has concluded that 
the legislative veto is unlawful.  Most often the problem is a failure to 
comply with bicameralism or presentment requirements, though 
sometimes the courts find that legislatures violated separation-of-
powers principles by infringing on the authority of the executive or 
judicial departments.  Part III draws on the legal opinions canvassed in 
the previous Part to assess the constitutionality of JCAR and General 
Assembly vetoes in Illinois.  It concludes that in time the Illinois 
Supreme Court will almost surely rule that the legislative veto is 
unlawful.  Part IV offers some thoughts on alternatives to the current 
JCAR system that would be more likely to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.  The Article concludes with a recommendation that the 
General Assembly modify the current statutory scheme before the 
Illinois Supreme Court is compelled to rule on its constitutionality. 
I.  ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF JCAR 
The rise of the administrative state and the establishment of a “fourth 
branch” of government is a defining feature of our modern republic.  
Since the New Deal, both Congress and state legislatures have created 
myriad administrative agencies in the executive branch, delegating to 
these agencies authority to promulgate rules and regulations to 
effectuate their legislative goals.  To be sure, legislatures have the 
authority to create their own rules through their lawmaking powers.  But 
it is universally acknowledged that the legislative process is too 
cumbersome, and that legislators’ expertise is too uneven, to expect 
legislative bodies to pass laws with the “requisite specificity to cover 
endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape.”34  
Agencies, in contrast, are in theory staffed with experts who can craft 
rules appropriate to make the legislative vision a practical reality.  And 
agency rulemaking is a more nimble and efficient process than 
legislation.  Finally, federal and state courts have uniformly held that 
the legislative delegation of rulemaking power to administrative 
agencies may be done without violating separation-of-powers 
principles. 
But the legislative delegation of rulemaking authority for purposes of 
expertise and efficiency comes at a price.  Once executive agencies are 
 
34. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of 
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1183 (1999). 
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authorized to promulgate rules, the legislature can effectively be frozen 
out of the rulemaking process.35  Like Apollo handing his chariot’s 
reins to Phaethon, the legislature may find itself powerless to corral 
agency action it deems misguided, counterproductive, or ultra vires. 
Unsurprisingly, state and federal legislatures want to keep the 
benefits that attend the delegation of rulemaking authority to agencies, 
but also want to retain as much control over the promulgated rules as 
possible.  Lawsuits seeking injunctions against the implementation of 
agency rules are always possible, as is the tool of corrective legislation.  
But such measures are time consuming and expensive.  Moreover, their 
success is uncertain, as a judge may find no merit to the legislature’s 
claims of agency overreach, or the chief executive may choose to veto 
the legislature’s attempts at corrective action. 
Illinois, like the other states in the union, has experimented with a 
variety of ways to bring meaningful oversight to agency rulemaking.  
Over the course of four decades, such oversight has evolved from 
establishing JCAR as an inform-and-advise committee for the review of 
agency rulemaking, to the authorization of veto powers for the General 
Assembly, and finally to the granting of veto powers to JCAR itself. 
A.  The JCAR “Inform-and-Advise” Era, 1975–1980 
By the mid-1970s, Illinois had sixty-five major administrative 
agencies and nearly 250 smaller boards and commissions.36  To manage 
the “complex, duplicative and chaotic” sprawl,37 the General Assembly 
passed the IAPA in 1975.38  Like the federal Administrative Procedure 
Act,39 the IAPA established procedures for the conduct of 
administrative proceedings, for the promulgation of rules and 
regulations,40 for administrative adjudication, and for licensing and rate-
 
35. L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: 
Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 86–87 (1982). 
36. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 447 (1986); see also id. (“Indeed, [by the mid-1970s], no single source could produce 
a complete organization chart or even a listing of all Illinois agencies, boards and commissions”). 
37. Id. 
38. Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. Act 79-1083, 1975 Ill. Laws 3312 (codified as 
amended at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1 to 15-10). 
39. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2012)). 
40. Under the IAPA, a “rule” is “each agency statement of general applicability that 
implements, applies, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.”  5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-70 (2016)  
Unless otherwise noted in the text, the terms “rules” and “regulations” will be used 
interchangeably in this article.  Cf. S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 538 (Ill. App. Ct. 
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making.41 
Two years later, as part of an overhaul of the IAPA, the General 
Assembly created JCAR.42  As JCAR itself explained in its first annual 
report to the General Assembly, the committee was established in 
response to the state’s “increasing reliance on and power of 
administrative agencies to fulfill vital functions of the state,” and out of 
concern that agencies “have obscured the traditional notion of 
separation of powers.”43  Although the need for agency rulemaking 
remained unquestioned, the sheer volume of rules—matching or 
exceeding the number of statutory laws in Illinois—was perceived as a 
threat to the General Assembly’s ability to ensure that the limits of the 
statutory authority it had provided to agencies were respected.44 
The composition of JCAR was to be twelve members of the General 
Assembly, with three each chosen by the majority and minority leaders 
of the House and Senate.45  Broadly speaking, its functions were two-
fold: to promote “adequate and proper” rulemaking by agencies, and to 
promote “understanding on the part of the public respecting such 
rules.”46  JCAR was thus best understood as a watchdog committee 
designed in large part to assure that rulemaking was accomplished in a 
transparent and politically accountable fashion. 
Most importantly, JCAR was responsible for reviewing all new rules 
proposed by administrative agencies.47  This review had to take place 
promptly after promulgation of a proposed rule.48  JCAR was required 
to assess whether the agency had acted within its statutory authority 
when promulgating the rule, whether the rule was in proper form, and 
whether sufficient notice had been given to the public prior to the rule’s 
 
2002) (stating that “rules . . . are synonymous with regulations” (citing United Consumers Club, 
Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 456 N.E.2d 856, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983))); Granite City Div. of Nat’l Steel 
Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 613 N.E.2d 719, 729 (Ill. 1993) (holding that the agency had 
“rulemaking authority to promulgate these regulations”). 
41. The IAPA was amended in 1977 to make all agencies subject to its rulemaking 
requirements.  Until its amendment, section 2 of the IAPA exempted agencies from compliance 
with the Act unless the law that created the agency expressly stated that it was to conform to the 
Act.  Act of Sept. 27, 1977, Pub. Act 80-1035, 1977 Ill. Laws 3040. 
42. Id. 
43. 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 10. 
44. Id. at 11. 
45. Act of Sept. 27, 1977, Pub. Act 80-1035, 1977 Ill. Laws 3045. 
46. Id. at 3046. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 3047. 
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adoption.49  If JCAR had any concerns, it was initially to inform the 
agency, which would then have to respond to JCAR indicating whether 
it had elected to modify the proposed rule, withdraw it altogether, or 
leave it unchanged.50  If the agency refused to amend or withdraw the 
rule—or if it refused to respond to JCAR at all, which apparently would 
happen on occasion51—JCAR was authorized to propose corrective 
legislation to the General Assembly.52 
JCAR had other duties as well—all designed to be part and parcel of 
its role as a body to gather information and make recommendations to 
the full legislature.  Among its other significant responsibilities, the 
committee was to engage in a “systematic and continuing study of the 
rules and rule-making processes of all state agencies . . . for the purpose 
of improving the rule-making process” and eliminating redundancies in 
the rules.53  JCAR was tasked with establishing a review program to 
study the impact of legislative changes, court rulings, and administrative 
action on agency rules and rulemaking.54  JCAR was also expected to 
engage in a periodic review, at least every five years, of the rules of 
each agency, examining the economic and budgetary effects of the rules 
and ways they might be made more efficient.55 
As originally conceived, JCAR had no coercive authority over 
administrative agencies, and possessed “advisory powers only relating 
to its function.”56  Neither JCAR nor the General Assembly could 
modify, delay, or stop the implementation of rules that either body 
 
49. Id.  JCAR further interpreted this statutory provision to authorize review of (1) the 
agency’s legal authority to promulgate its rule; (2) the agency’s compliance with legislative 
intent; (3) the agency’s compliance with state and federal constitutional requirements and other 
law; (4) the agency’s statement of justification and rationale for the proposed rulemaking; (5) 
anticipated economic effects of the proposed rulemaking; (6) clarity of the language of the 
proposed rulemaking; (7) sufficient completeness and clarity to insure meaningful guidelines and 
standards in the exercise of agency discretion; (8) redundancies, grammatical deficiencies, and 
technical errors in the proposed rulemaking; and (9) compliance of the agency with the 
requirements of the IAPA.  JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 344 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 JCAR REPORT]. 
50. Act of Sept. 27, 1977, Pub. Act 80-1035, 1977 Ill. Laws 3047. 
51. See 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 149 (noting the “lack of responsiveness of 
agencies to the objections issued by the Committee,” and that an “increased number of agencies 
were refusing to withdraw or modify proposed rulemakings in response to objections issued by 
the Joint Committee”). 
52. Act of Sept. 27, 1977, Pub. Act 80-1035, 1977 Ill. Laws 3047–48. 
53. Id. at 3046–47. 
54. Id. at 3047. 
55. Id. at 3049. 
56. Id. at 3046 (emphasis added). 
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deemed unlawful or unauthorized by statute, except through the 
ordinary legislative process. 
Nonetheless, in the first years of its existence, the JCAR scheme 
showed promising signs it was improving administrative agency 
rulemaking.  As already noted, JCAR reviewed hundreds of new rules 
from administrative agencies in its first year of operation, found 
“serious problems” with more than one-third of them, but was able to 
resolve its concerns in most instances through informal interaction with 
the agencies.57  Only 15% of the proposed rules it reviewed required 
formal action from JCAR.58  The committee reported there was a 
“desire of agencies to change rules to correct serious problems and also 
the extent of those issues where serious problems were unresolved 
without formal Joint Committee action.”59 
In 1979, JCAR reviewed over five hundred more new rules, resolving 
many of their concerns through cooperation with the agencies and 
objecting in only sixty-five instances.60  Among other activities, JCAR 
initiated a five-year comprehensive review of rules of all agencies, 
worked with the Secretary of State to develop a uniform system for the 
codification of all state agency rules in Illinois, and saw most of its 
twenty recommendations for new legislation passed by the General 
Assembly.61  In its self-assessment, JCAR concluded that its activities 
had made “a significant impact on agency-made law in Illinois,” and 
that it had “fulfill[ed] an important systematic substantive oversight 
function for the Illinois General Assembly.”62 
JCAR initially praised the wisdom of the General Assembly in 
granting it only inform-and-advise powers, explaining that the review 
scheme “was designed to insure the integrity of both the administrative 
rulemaking process and the proper legislative process of lawmaking.”63 
B.  The General Assembly Veto Era, 1981–2004 
But notwithstanding public claims to its efficacy, even early in its 
 
57. See 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 17–18.  JCAR Annual Reports are a useful 
resource for the public.  Other states lack the transparency that such reporting provides.  See, e.g., 
Dean, supra note 38, at 1165 (noting the lack of transparency that attends the work of a similar 
legislative review committee in Missouri). 
58. 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 18. 
59. Id. 
60. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 3. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 11. 
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tenure JCAR began to bristle at the statutory constraints that had been 
imposed on it.  Although the committee had gotten traction with some 
agencies, others “refused to modify the rulemaking in response to the 
Joint Committee’s objections.”64  Without some kind of coercive power 
over the agencies, JCAR’s comments on proposed rules could be 
ignored with impunity.  The perception among some legislators, 
staffers, and legislative observers at the time was that JCAR had, in 
reality, “little control” over administrative agencies.65 
During its second year of existence, JCAR prepared a staff paper, 
titled Alternatives for Strengthening Legislative Review of 
Administrative Rules in Illinois, suggesting various ways in which its 
supervisory powers, along with those of the General Assembly, could 
be enhanced.66  The report included a review of systems in other states, 
noting that many had lodged limited veto powers in legislative review 
committees like JCAR.67 
Enhanced powers were desirable, according to JCAR, because the 
current inform-and-advise process was not sufficiently nimble to bring 
about timely modification of objectionable rules from recalcitrant 
agencies.  Amendment by legislation was a lengthy process, and the 
contested rules would remain in effect pending the successful 
completion of the legislative process.68  In addition, rule modification 
through legislation was inadvisable where specific areas of regulation 
were “too technical or complex” or where JCAR’s objections were “of 
such a nature that corrective changes in statutory language” might be 
“extremely complex and could result in harmful overspecificity in the 
statutory language.”69 
In its 1979 staff paper, JCAR proposed nine alternatives to the 
current regime—changes ranging from the constitutionally 
unobjectionable, like enhancing the committee’s authority to comment 
on proposed rules’ economic impact,70 to the constitutionally 
implausible, like authorizing JCAR to compel an agency to promulgate 
 
64. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 121. 
65. CHRISTOPHER Z. MOONEY & TIM STOREY, THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1992–
2003: LEADERSHIP CONTROL, CONTINUITY, AND PARTNERSHIP 38 (2004). 
66. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 389–96 (“JCAR Staff Paper: Alternatives for 
Strengthening Legislative Review of Administrative Rules in Illinois”). 
67. Id. at 389–91. 
68. Id. at 392. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 394. 
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a rule.71  The full set of suggestions from the staff paper will be 
discussed later in this Article.72 
In the end, JCAR sought General Assembly approval for a pair of 
alternatives to the extant inform-and-advise approach.  The first would 
have removed the presumption of validity accorded to administrative 
rules in court challenges if JCAR formally objected to a rule and the 
agency failed to modify or withdraw it.73  The status quo was that a rule 
promulgated by an agency would be presumed to be a lawful exercise of 
the agency’s statutory powers.74  The threat of reversing the 
presumption would, it was thought, provide incentive for the agency to 
be responsive to JCAR comments rather than risk judicial disapproval 
of the rule.75  The proposal was passed by both Houses of the General 
Assembly in 1979, but was vetoed by the Governor—on the ground that 
it violated separation-of-powers principles—and did not become law.76 
The second proposal was far more ambitious.  At JCAR’s urging, the 
General Assembly considered authorizing JCAR to veto agency rules 
that it determined constituted a serious threat to the public interest, 
safety, or welfare.77  The veto would be permanent unless the General 
Assembly passed a joint resolution overturning it.78 
In its staff paper, JCAR acknowledged that a proposal of this type 
“would result in the most serious legal issues,” including “whether 
passage of a resolution can affect law, since it eliminates the approval of 
the Governor required under normal legislative lawmaking.”79  
Admitting that the proposal “could raise constitutional questions about 
separation of powers,”80 JCAR staff nonetheless concluded the 
approach was defensible because the legislature was “merely 
 
71. Id. at 396 (“Very serious constitutional questions could be raised about this alternative.”). 
72. See infra Part IV. 
73. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 393–94. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.  The Model State Administrative Procedure Act includes a similar burden-reversing 
provision.  See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 3-204 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1981); 
see also David S. Neslin, Comment, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?  Gubernatorial and 
Legislative Review of Agency Rulemaking Under the 1981 Model Act, 57 WASH. L. REV. 669, 
686 (1982) (discussing “reversed burden of persuasion” schemes). 
76. The Senate subsequently overrode the veto, but the measure did not receive the three-fifth 
vote needed for an override in the House.  See 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 122. 
77. The veto could be issued either before a rule became effective or within sixty days of its 
implementation.  See id. at 159 (“Recommended Bill Two”). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 396. 
80. Id. at 395. 
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conditioning” its delegation of rulemaking authority to the agencies.81  
“Of course,” the paper languidly concluded, “a court may view the issue 
differently.”82 
This JCAR veto provision was considered by the General Assembly 
in 1979 but was never brought to a vote.83  As discussed below, 
however, it would become law nearly a quarter century later.84 
In 1980, the General Assembly did pass a reform measure, 
authorizing for the first time a legislative veto over agency rulemaking.  
Described by JCAR as a “cooling off” provision for “improper agency 
rules,”85 the statute allowed JCAR to “prohibit” and thereby delay the 
implementation of new rules (or to “suspend” the effect of emergency 
rules) for up to 180 days.  JCAR prohibitions and suspensions were 
authorized upon a finding, by a three-fifths vote of the committee, that 
the rules were “objectionable” under standards laid out elsewhere in the 
IAPA,86 and that they “constitute[d] a serious threat to the public 
interest, safety or welfare.”87  Although the prohibition or suspension 
was temporary, the General Assembly could make either permanent 
through passage of a joint resolution.88 
In its 1980 Annual Report, JCAR denied that the new statute 
authorized a “legislative veto” over agency rulemaking.89  But that 
claim was misleading, if not disingenuous.  Under the new law, the 
General Assembly possessed the power to permanently prevent 
implementation of administrative agency rules through the passage of a 
joint resolution that did not need to proceed through the usual 
constitutional requirements for passage of a bill, and that did not need to 
be presented to the Governor for a possible veto.90  In other words, the 
 
81. Id. at 394. 
82. Id.  The Staff Paper also noted that one effect of this proposal might be that agencies 
would evade JCAR altogether by simply not filing its rules and thereby pushing rulemaking 
underground. Id.  Under these circumstances, the public would have difficulty determining 
whether to hold the agency or JCAR responsible for the substance of the rule. In addition, the 
staff noted that JCAR could “continue to disclaim actual responsibility for the substance of rule 
[sic], . . . but it is problemmatic [sic] whether the general public would actually distinguish 
between this veto power and an actual approval power.”  Id. at 395. 
83. H.R. 1503, 81st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1979). 
84. See infra Part I.C. 
85. 1980 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 1. 
86. Act of Jan. 1, 1981, Pub. Act 81-1514, 1977 Ill. Laws 3898 (modifying sections 7.04, 
7.05, 7.07, and 7.08 of the IAPA). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. 1980 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 109. 
90. In order for a bill to become law in Illinois, it must among other things be presented to the 
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General Assembly now indisputably possessed a legislative veto. 
Unsurprisingly, the Governor vetoed the bill after it was presented to 
him by the General Assembly.  He argued that it “constitute[d] a serious 
and unwarranted intrusion by the General Assembly and one of its 
committees into areas properly reserved to the executive and judicial 
branches of government,” that it “would violate the separation and 
delegation of powers provision in the Illinois Constitution, and would 
seriously jeopardize the fair and orderly processes of government in 
Illinois.”91  This time, though, the General Assembly overrode the 
Governor’s veto. 
In its Annual Report for 1980, JCAR assured the public that the new 
powers shared by it and the General Assembly were “entirely proper,” 
even though “legal arguments about the constitutionality of these 
provisions is likely to continue for some time.”92  Strangely, though, 
constitutional arguments about the lawfulness of the General Assembly 
veto have not often been raised in the courts.  In fact, the Illinois courts 
have not yet ruled on the constitutionality of either the General 
Assembly veto or of the pure JCAR veto (its successor, which will be 
discussed in the next Section). 
By its own account, JCAR was not shy about flexing its new muscle.  
JCAR’s objections to new rules were now backed by the threat of a 
permanent suspension by the General Assembly if its concerns were not 
remedied by the promulgating agency.  Unsurprisingly, agencies grew 
more responsive to the committee, though a superficial glance at the 
numbers might hide this fact. 
In 1981, JCAR reviewed more than six hundred proposed rules,93 and 
formally objected to only thirty of them.  This ratio of objections to 
rules might seem low, at least compared with the prior few years.  But 
JCAR noted that “virtually all of the rules” it looked at “were changed 
in some way by the Committee’s review.”94  Agencies, it seemed, were 
more responsive to JCAR comments after passage of the amendatory 
statute, because any residual JCAR discontent with the agency’s 
rulemaking could now, with some ease, lead to the permanent quashing 
of the new rule.  JCAR, of course, was satisfied that this new power 
 
Governor for a possible executive veto.  ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 9.  For a full discussion of the state 
constitutional requirements for lawmaking, see infra Part III.B. 
91. 1980 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 110 (quoting Governor James R. Thompson). 
92. Id. at 111. 
93. 1981 JCAR REPORT, supra note 10, at 28. 
94. 1981 JCAR REPORT, supra note 10, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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“significantly strengthened” the impact of its review process and would 
enhance its effectiveness moving forward.95 
JCAR’s first use of its prohibition powers came swiftly in 1981, 
when it blocked implementation of a proposed set of rules from the 
Illinois Health Finance Authority (“IHFA”) that would have regulated 
the financial management of hospitals.96  The status quo that the IHFA 
sought to change had hospitals determining the rates for their services 
retrospectively, after they had delivered services to patients and 
computed costs.  The IHFA rules would instead have mandated 
prospective rate-setting, pursuant to which the IHFA would approve in 
advance the amount of revenue a hospital could generate each year. 
JCAR filed a prohibition on implementation of the rule, finding that 
the IHFA had adopted an “improper definition” of the term “hospital 
services” that would result in a discontinuation of services and a “threat 
to the welfare of Illinois citizens”; that forcing hospitals to fill out the 
required reports would “pose a serious threat to the interests of 
consumers of health care”; that the IFHA’s promulgation of the rules at 
the same time it was negotiating payer differentials “pose[d] a serious 
threat to the interest of Illinois citizens by raising private insurance 
premium rates”; and that the IHFA’s promulgation of the rules while 
negotiating with the federal government over grants of contingent 
liability “will cause increased costs and/or decreased quality of care and 
pose a serious threat to Illinois Citizens.”97 
The justifications offered by JCAR for its first act of prohibition are 
laid out here to make a couple of points.  First, the fact that JCAR used 
its power to prohibit the immediate implementation of a set of rules 
within months of receiving statutory authority to do so was a signal to 
agencies that the weapon would not sit unused.  Second, JCAR swiftly 
adopted a broad understanding of its authority to prohibit or suspend 
new rules, which by statute could only be used where the proposed rules 
“would constitute a serious threat to the public interest, safety, or 
welfare.”98  There is no definition in the statute of what would 
constitute a “serious” threat, including whether economic impact of 
some sort alone can meet that standard.  But at least three and perhaps 
all four of the justifications that JCAR offered for prohibiting the 
 
95. Id. at 28. 
96. 1981 JCAR REPORT, supra note 10, at 31–32. 
97. Id. 
98. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(a) (2016). 
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IHFA’s rules were fundamentally economic in nature. 
Unsurprisingly, the IHFA revised its proposed rules following JCAR 
prohibition rather than face the prospect of passage of a General 
Assembly joint resolution that would have made the suspension 
permanent.  The IHFA and other agencies were learning, in short, that 
JCAR was now a force and that its objections had to be addressed. 
Over the course of the roughly two decades during which JCAR had 
the authority to prohibit or suspend the implementation of rules subject 
to the prohibition or suspension becoming permanent by a General 
Assembly joint resolution, JCAR found it necessary to exercise this 
power just a few dozen times.  Between 1981 and the end of 2003, 
JCAR was responsible for reviewing fully 12,395 proposed general 
rules from state agencies99 and 1867 emergency rules.100  During this 
period, the committee filed only thirty-nine prohibitions or suspensions 
from among these 14,262 proposed agency rules.101 
The small number of prohibitions and suspensions may be evidence 
that administrative agencies took the threat of a JCAR suspension and 
subsequent General Assembly joint resolution seriously.  Most rules 
were modified or withdrawn after JCAR comment, before JCAR had to 
issue a suspension.  When the committee did suspend a rule, the in 
terrorem value of a looming joint resolution almost always led to 
agency capitulation. 
In the fifteen years between 1981 and 1995, every one of the nineteen 
JCAR suspensions led to the promulgating agency either modifying its 
rule in accord with JCAR’s wishes or else withdrawing its rule 
altogether.102  During the following nine years, between 1996 and 2004, 
JCAR suspended proposed rules nineteen times, with the promulgating 
agencies “voluntarily” modifying or withdrawing their rules in ten of 
those instances.  Of the remaining nine suspended rules—where the 
 
99. These numbers can be reconstructed by from statistical tables in JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. 
RULES, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 69 (2014) [hereinafter 
2013 JCAR REPORT] (showing 13,940 proposed general rules between 1978 and 2003); 1980 
JCAR REPORT, supra note 10, at 24 (showing 563 proposed general rules in 1980); 1979 JCAR 
REPORT, supra note 49, at 21 (showing 475 proposed general rules in 1979); and 1978 JCAR 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 21 (showing 507 proposed general rules in 1978). 
100. These numbers can be reconstructed from statistical tables in 2013 JCAR REPORT, supra 
note 99, at 73 (showing 2079 proposed emergency rules between 1978 and 2003); 1980 JCAR 
REPORT, supra note 49, at 24 (showing ninety-seven proposed emergency rules in 1980); 1979 
JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 21 (showing 102 proposed emergency rules in 1979); and 1978 
JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 21 (showing 133 proposed emergency rules in 1978). 
101. 2013 JCAR REPORT, supra note 99, at 58–60. 
102. Id. at 58–59. 
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agencies girded themselves for a confrontation with the General 
Assembly—JCAR withdrew its objections in six instances (though all 
involved a single set of rules by a single agency) and the General 
Assembly refused to pass a joint resolution making JCAR suspensions 
permanent in three instances. 
In short, agency pushback against JCAR was successful only a 
handful of times between 1981 and 2004, when JCAR suspensions 
could be enforced by a General Assembly veto.  Rational agency actors 
clearly understood that their proposed rules would survive JCAR review 
only if they modified them to JCAR’s satisfaction.103 
C.  The JCAR Veto Era, 2004–Present 
JCAR’s powers grew even stronger in the summer of 2004, when the 
General Assembly again revised the IAPA.  For more than two decades, 
JCAR’s suspension authority had assured the committee possessed a 
powerful, coercive tool to wield against administrative agencies.  But 
the suspension still required General Assembly approval within 180 
days in order to become permanent. 
The 2004 statutory amendment inaugurated a sea change.  Moving 
forward, a JCAR prohibition or suspension of an agency’s rule would 
become permanent unless the General Assembly voted by joint 
resolution (within six months) to reverse it.104  In other words, JCAR 
could now presumptively veto any new agency rule.  The General 
Assembly was voting to hand over its legislative veto power to JCAR, 
“empowering the Members of JCAR who are appointed to serve on that 
body, to act on their behalf, as their representatives.”105  The floor 
debate in the House on the measure indicated that at least some 
members understood that this legislation would be a “fundamental 
change in the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative 
branches,”106 although to be fair the “fundamental change” really had 
 
103. See Neslin, supra note 75, at 690 n.128 (noting that “[a]gencies usually withdraw or 
modify rules to meet committee objections,” and citing sources). 
104. 100 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115(c)(2016) (stating that after JCAR objects to a proposed rule, 
“any member of the General Assembly may introduce in the General Assembly a joint resolution 
stating that the General Assembly desires to discontinue the prohibition against the proposed rule, 
amendment, or repealer or the portion thereof to which the statement was issued being filed and 
taking effect,” and “[i]f the joint resolution is not passed by both houses of the General Assembly 
within 180 days . . . the agency shall be prohibited from filing the proposed rule . . . and [it] shall 
not take effect”). 
105. H.R., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 166th Sess., at 34 (Ill. July 24, 2004). 
106. Id. at 32. 
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come in 1980, when the General Assembly had authorized the 
legislative veto in the first place. 
The measure was proposed and passed in haste, at a time when then-
Governor Rod Blagojevich’s relationship with the General Assembly 
was already in steep decline.107 As one lawmaker remarked, this “was 
one of those significant Bills that actually never went through the 
legislative process, so we haven’t had a chance to debate it.  I 
understand it surfaced yesterday for the first time.”108  He also observed 
that “[w]e are so caught up in the personalities of the Governor and the 
Legislature that we’re not even seeing straight about the relationship 
between these two branches.”109 
This change was momentous.  The twelve-member JCAR now had 
legislative veto powers unprecedented in the state’s history.  To the 
degree administrative agencies could, during the last twenty-five years, 
at least consider the prospect of standing up to JCAR and getting their 
rules implemented, any realistic prospect of getting past JCAR had just 
evaporated.  Overnight, JCAR had become one of the most powerful 
government entities in the state—virtually a branch unto itself. 
Strangely, JCAR barely acknowledged this development in its 2004 
Annual Report, failing to mention it altogether in the introductory or 
overview materials, and burying the news in the middle of a paragraph 
thirty-eight pages into the report.110 
But this was in fact no small change.  During the twenty-three years 
that a JCAR veto would become permanent only if backed by a General 
Assembly joint resolution (between 1981 and 2003), JCAR delayed or 
suspended rules only thirty-nine times.  During the ten years when a 
JCAR veto became permanent unless it was overturned by a joint 
resolution (between 2004 and 2013), the committee issued fifty-four 
vetoes.  In other words, since the JCAR veto went into effect in 2004, 
the rate of JCAR suspensions and objections had more than tripled, 
from 1.7 per year to 5.4 per year.111 
The most recent chapter of JCAR story was written in 2009, when the 
 
107. See id. (discussing the relationship between the Governor and the legislature). 
108. Id. at 31. 
109. Id. at 32.  The provision passed the House 110–4, and passed the Senate 49–5. 
110. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 41 (2005). 
111. It is for this reason that JCAR’s powers prior to 2004 have occasionally been described 
as anemic.  See CHRISTOPHER Z. MOONEY & TIM STOREY, THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
1992–2003: LEADERSHIP CONTROL, CONTINUITY, AND PARTNERSHIP 39 (2005) (discussing the 
belief that JCAR had little control over agencies). 
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General Assembly passed House Bill 398, which states that “[a]ll 
rulemaking authority exercised on or after [the law’s effective date] is 
conditioned on the rules being adopted in accordance with all provisions 
of this Act and all rules and procedures of the Joint Committee on 
Administrative Rules (JCAR).”112  This language was presumably 
intended to buttress the JCAR veto against judicial challenge.  Indeed, 
further language in House Bill 398 makes this conclusion seem 
inevitable: “[A]ny purported rule not so adopted, for whatever reason, 
including without limitation a decision of a court of competent 
jurisdiction holding any part of this Act or the rules or procedures of 
JCAR invalid, is unauthorized.”113 
This remarkable provision suggests the General Assembly’s intent 
that even if the courts decide that a JCAR veto violates separation-of-
powers principles, the vetoed rule still cannot take effect.114  As 
discussed below, there is every reason to believe that this statute 
represents legislative overreach, compounding rather than resolving the 
serious constitutional issues that JCAR and General Assembly 
legislative veto provisions raise. 
II.  LAWFULNESS OF LEGISLATIVE VETOES OVER AGENCY RULEMAKING 
NATIONWIDE 
With rare exceptions, legislative veto schemes have been ruled 
unconstitutional in jurisdictions across the nation.  To be sure, there is 
something compelling about the logic of the legislative veto.  The 
authority to delegate rulemaking powers to an administrative body also 
plausibly entails the authority to delegate a lesser power—the power to 
promulgate rules subject to preapproval by the legislature.  And 
legislative review of proposed rules seems consonant with values of 
democratic participation, because the final decision about whether rules 
go into effect will be made by the elected representatives of the people 
rather than by executive branch appointees.  The availability of a 
legislative veto also relieves the legislature of having to make the 
 
112. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-6 (2016). 
113. Id. 
114. During floor debate, a state senator asked what would happen if “rules are promulgated 
and a court finds . . . the Administrative Code or the Joint Committee invalid—help me 
understand the logic how this statute could still have those rules continue to have the force of 
law.”  S., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen. Assemb., 13th Sess., at 12 (Ill. Feb. 11, 2009) 
(statement of Sen. Rutherford).  The puzzling response was that if an agency chose to promulgate 
rules, then it necessarily would be consenting to the JCAR scheme.  Id. (statement of Sen. 
Clayborne). 
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difficult choice of deciding whether to delegate rulemaking authority to 
an agency (and thus lose effective control over the process) or to reserve 
rulemaking authority for itself and consequently have to draft detailed 
rules by politicians with little or no expertise on the subject matter. 
Yet, the chief problem, as identified by federal and state courts, is 
that legislative vetoes allow legislatures to act outside of the constraints 
of constitutionally mandated lawmaking procedures, wielding power 
through an “extra-legislative control device.”115  Statutes that allow 
agency rules to be nullified by passage of a joint resolution of both 
houses of a legislature, for example, do not comply with constitutional 
provisions for the presentment of bills to the executive for a potential 
veto.  Statutes that allow for rule nullification by the majority vote of a 
single house of the legislature—so-called one-house vetoes—possess 
not only a presentment but also a constitutional bicameralism problem.  
And schemes that allow smaller legislative committees to act 
unilaterally to kill agency rules arguably present not only bicameralism 
and presentment problems, but also potentially raise a delegation issue. 
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court held in INS v. Chadha that 
legislative vetoes cannot be squared with the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements of the United States Constitution.116  Several 
states had previously come to the same conclusion under state 
constitutional law, and following the release of Chadha many more 
states likewise ruled legislative vetoes unconstitutional.  As I discuss in 
the next Part, the pertinent constitutional provisions in the Illinois 
Constitution are fundamentally indistinguishable from those relied on in 
these other federal and state cases, which suggests that legislative vetoes 
are unlikely to survive future judicial scrutiny in Illinois. 
This Part will first describe the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
congressional vetoes in the Chadha case.  Discussion will then shift to 
an overview of the status of state schemes for legislative vetoes of 
agency rulemaking in each state in which a judicial or attorney general 
opinion has been issued.  In only one state has such a legislative veto 
scheme been deemed constitutional. 
 
115. H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out; A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 
63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 990–91 (1975) (critiquing legislative vetoes as extra-legislative control 
devices that unconstitutionally allow “the creation of power . . . to be wielded by the hand 
creating it”). 
116. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953–54 (1983). 
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A.  The Legislative Veto in the Federal System 
The doctrine of separation of powers is, of course, fundamental to our 
federal and state systems of government.  Baron Charles de 
Montesquieu, whose The Spirit of Laws served as a primer for the 
Framers of the federal Constitution, observed that the admixture of 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers would tend toward 
oppression and the loss of liberty.117  James Madison echoed these 
cautions in Federalist No. 47, writing that the “accumulation of all 
powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether 
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or 
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”118 
But neither Montesquieu nor Madison believed that a perfect 
separation of powers among the departments of government was 
advisable or even possible.  What chiefly needed to be guarded against, 
according to Madison, was the undermining of freedom that would 
occur when “the whole power of one department is exercised by the 
same hands which possess the whole power of another department.”119  
Montesquieu, according to Madison, “did not mean that these 
departments ought to have no partial agency or no control over the acts 
of each other.”120  He illustrated the utility of imperfect separation with 
examples from the several states.121  For instance, Massachusetts 
authorized executive vetoes of legislative action as a “qualified 
negative” on the body; provided for impeachment of members of the 
executive and judicial branches by the senate; and allowed for 
appointment of judges by the executive branch, with removal power in 
the hands of the executive and legislative branches working in 
tandem.122 
Still, it was clear to Madison that the arrogation of power to the 
 
117. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 
(Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989). 
118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 244 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books ed., 1992).  
Likewise, George Washington warned in his Farewell Address that the “spirit of encroachment 
tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the 
form of government, a real despotism.”  George Washington, Farewell Address, in 13 WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 306 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1892). 
119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 118, at 245. 
120. Id. at 248; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 118, at 253 (James Madison) 
(stating it was unnecessary that “the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be 
wholly unconnected with each other”). 
121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 118, at 246–49 (James Madison). 
122. Id. at 246–47. 
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legislative branch was the chief evil to be avoided, as it “is every where 
extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its 
impetuous vortex.”123  The legislature was a body that deemed itself 
most in touch with the will of the people, possessed the most influence 
over them, and was “sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions 
which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of 
pursuing the objects of its passions.”124  Its constitutional powers were 
“at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits” than 
those of the other branches, and it could “with the greater facility, mask 
under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it 
makes on the co-ordinate departments.”125  These sentiments have 
echoed through American jurisprudence.126 
The insight was that although there was wisdom in granting the 
executive conditional veto power over the legislature, the obverse was 
not true.  As Montesquieu explained, the legislature should have the 
right and the power “to examine the manner in which the laws it has 
made have been executed” so as to hold the executive accountable.127  
But it should not have the “reciprocal faculty of checking the executive 
power,”128 because there would then be no limit to the powers the 
legislature could arrogate to itself. 
It is against this historical background that the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed for the first time the constitutionality of legislative vetoes in 
Chadha.129  At issue in the case was a federal statute that authorized the 
Attorney General of the United States to suspend an alien’s deportation 
order, subject to disapproval of the Attorney General’s action by either 
 
123. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 118, at 251 (James Madison). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (“[T]he debates of the Constitutional 
Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative 
Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two 
branches.”); Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Ky. 1984) (noting 
that a “motivating factor” that led to the Kentucky Constitution was “a strong desire on the part of 
the people to curb the power of the General Assembly”).  See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES 
ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 214 (1784) (“[T]he powers of government should be so divided and 
balanced among several bodies . . . that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being 
effectually checked and restrained by the others.”). 
127. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 117, at 162 (emphasis added). 
128. Id. 
129. Prior to its decision in Chadha, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo decided it was 
unnecessary to pass on the validity of legislative veto.  424 U.S. at 140 n.176 (1976).  In 
concurrence, Justice White stated that he thought the legislative veto was not unconstitutional.  
Id. at 284–85 (White, J., concurring). 
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the Senate or House of Representatives by means of a resolution.130  In 
short, the question was whether a “one-House veto” over executive 
action was constitutional.131 
The Court acknowledged that legislative vetoes had proliferated in 
the states since the 1930s, in part because such schemes seemed to offer 
a convenient and efficient way to police executive compliance with 
legislation.132  It likewise nodded toward the robust scholarly debate 
about the policy benefits of legislative vetoes.133  But the wisdom of the 
legislation, according to the Court, had no bearing on the constitutional 
questions before it.134  Instead, the problem with the legislative veto 
was that it was incompatible with separation-of-powers principles in the 
broad sense, and that it violated the Constitution’s presentment and 
bicameralism requirements in particular.135 
With respect to presentment, the Constitution requires that “[e]very 
bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of 
the United States” for a potential veto.136  The presentment requirement 
was “so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains” to assure it 
could not be avoided, for example by calling a proposed law a 
“resolution” or a “vote” rather than a “bill.”137  The need to give the 
President a qualified power to nullify legislation through a veto “was 
based on the profound conviction of the Framers that the powers 
conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully 
circumscribed.”138  The executive veto was an effort to “check whatever 
 
130. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926–27 (1983) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2) (2012)). 
131. Id. at 927 n.2 (noting that the Court would refer to the “resolution” power as a “one-
House veto” of the Attorney General’s decision). 
132. Legislative veto provisions were included in federal legislation at least eighty-three times 
in 126 different acts of Congress between 1933 and 1976.  See H.R. Rep. No. 1014, at 14 (1976). 
133. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945. 
134. Id. 
135. Unlike in the constitutions of most states (including Illinois), there is no specific 
“separation of powers” provision in the federal Constitution.  The Court in Chadha noted, though, 
that the principle of “was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was 
woven into the document that they drafted.”  462 U.S. at 946 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 124 (1976)). 
136. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2; see also id. art I, § 7, cl. 3 (“Every Order, Resolution, or 
Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary . . . 
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, 
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the 
Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
137. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947. 
138. Id. 
15_FALKOFF FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  12:48 PM 
2016] Legislative Veto in Illinois 1081 
 
propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, 
improvident, or ill-considered measures.”139 
As for bicameralism, the Court noted that the Constitution required 
presentment of a bill to the President only after it “shall have passed the 
House of Representatives and the Senate.”140  The Court then quoted 
widely from the Framers about the wisdom of dividing the legislature 
into two houses and requiring bicameral agreement before presentation 
of a bill to the President.141 
The Court did not hold in Chadha that the legislative veto exercised 
by Congress was constitutionally invalid because Congress had 
exercised executive powers.  After acknowledging that the functions of 
government were not “hermetically sealed” from one another, the Court 
observed that the powers of the three branches were nonetheless 
“functionally identifiable” and that Congress had here in fact exercised 
legislative powers.142  First, the Court presumed that when a branch of 
government acts it is “exercising the power the Constitution has 
delegated to it.”143  And here the Constitution had delegated to 
Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”144  
According to the Court, Congress was attempting to exercise that power 
when it tried—through the use of the legislative veto—to overrule the 
Attorney General’s exercise of his statutory authority to suspend 
Chadha’s deportation.145 
The problem with Congress’s veto was instead simply that it 
represented an attempt to exercise the body’s legitimate legislative 
power in a manner that failed to comply with the constitutional 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.146 
 
139. Id. at 947–48. 
140. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7 (emphasis added). 
141. The Court quotes Madison, for example, expressing his view that, because the legislature 
dominates in a republican government, it is necessary “‘to divide the legislature into different 
branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as 
little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common 
dependence on the society will admit.’”  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
51, at 324 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)). 
142. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)). 
143. Id. at 951. 
144. Id. at 952 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
145. Id. at 952 (“Examination of the action taken here by one House . . . reveals that it was 
essentially legislative in purpose and effect.”). 
146. Id. at 953–54; see also Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of 
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276 (1991) (“If the power is executive, the Constitution does 
not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it.  If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise 
it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7.  In short, 
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Justice White dissented, offering a functionalist defense of the 
legislative veto against what he took to be the majority’s formalist 
approach.  He noted (correctly) that Chadha’s holding would 
immediately invalidate nearly two hundred other “legislative veto” 
provisions, which had been Congress’s attempt to assure that the 
executive and its independent agencies acted with some 
accountability.147  Without the legislative veto, he observed, Congress 
was now left with an unappealing choice—“either to refrain from 
delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with the hopeless task 
of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special 
circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to 
abdicate its law-making function to the Executive Branch and 
independent agencies.”148 
Justice White’s dissent was an impassioned plea to acknowledge that 
we are living in a new age, in which we have willingly made 
concessions to the purer vision of the separation-of-powers doctrine that 
was envisioned by the Framers.149  After all, legislative authority is 
already  
routinely delegated to the Executive Branch, to the independent 
regulatory agencies, and to private individuals and groups.  “The rise 
of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal 
trend of the last century. . . .  They have become a veritable fourth 
 
when Congress ‘[takes] action that ha[s] the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, 
and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch,’ it must take that action by the 
procedures authorized in the Constitution.” (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952–55) (alterations in 
original)); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425, 
476 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The fundamental problem of the one-house veto, then, is that it represents 
an attempt by Congress to retain direct control over delegated administrative power.  Congress 
may provide detailed rules of conduct to be administered without discretion by administrative 
officers, or it may provide broad policy guidance and leave the details to be filled in by 
administrative officers exercising substantial discretion.  It may not, however, insert one of its 
houses as an effective administrative decisionmaker.”). 
147. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968 (White, J., dissenting). 
148. Id. 
149. See Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power 
Over the Public Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the 
Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 28–29 (1984) (agreeing with the conclusion in 
Chadha, but suggesting the majority failed to recognize that not every “legislative” act is a law-
making act); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: 
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–30 (1994) 
(observing that while the majority accurately described the roles of each department and the 
importance of the separation of powers, it did not state why this particular veto violated those 
roles or separation-of-powers principles). 
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branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal 
theories.”150 
In short, Justice White suggested that the history of the separation-of-
powers doctrine in the United States had been one of “accommodation 
and practicality,” and that the Chadha disapproval of the legislative veto 
was unfaithful to this approach.151 
B.  The Legislative Veto in the States 
Like Congress, state legislatures have sought to gain control over 
administrative agencies by passing statutes that authorize legislative 
vetoes to permanently block implementation of proposed rules.152  In 
some states, the legislature must pass a joint resolution of both houses to 
kill agency rules, while in others a majority vote of just one house will 
be adequate.  In yet other states, a joint legislative committee can by 
majority vote singlehandedly keep regulations from being enforced. 
What these legislative veto schemes have in common is that, with a 
single exception, they have been deemed unlawful when their 
constitutionality has been challenged.  In at least twelve states, the 
 
150. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 984 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 
470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
151. Id. at 999.  A number of scholars agree with Justice White that the majority’s approach in 
Chadha simply ignored the evolution of lawmaking traditions, and that in fact the best way to 
protect separation-of-powers principles is to allow some legislative oversight of delegations to the 
other branches.  See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 149, at 27; Misty Ventura, The Legislative Veto: 
A Move Away From Separation of Powers or a Tool to Ensure Nondelegation?, 49 SMU L. REV. 
401, 431 (1996); William J. Wagner, Balancing as Art: Justice White and the Separation of 
Powers, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 957, 963 (2003).  For a collection of articles critiquing the 
majority’s reasoning in Chadha, see Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative 
Committee Suspension of Administrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237, 
1250 n.63 (1986). 
152. As of 1982, the year before Chadha was decided, eleven states had no system of 
legislative supervision, fifteen had advisory committees to review executive rulemaking and 
make recommendations to the full legislature to modify the rules by statute, one had a one-House 
veto, eleven had a two-House veto, and nine authorized a legislative committee to suspend the 
rule for a limited period of time pending final legislative action.  Levinson, supra note 35, at 81–
83; see also Neslin, supra note 75, at 674 nn. 28–29 (counting eighteen states that had authorized 
a legislative veto by one or both houses, but including in his list states where the authorization 
had already been deemed unconstitutional by the time of the Chadha decision); David Pascal 
Zambito, Comment, An “Irrc-some” Issue: Does Pennsylvania’s Regulatory Review Act Violate 
Separation of Powers?, 101 DICK. L. REV. 643, 643 n.4 (counting, as of 1982, forty-two states 
had some provision for legislative review of state regulations (citing Iver Peterson, Court’s 
Outlawing of Congress’s Veto Casts Shadows on State Legislatures, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1983, 
at A8)).  Each year, the Council of State Governments includes in its Book of the States tables 
identifying the powers and procedures of legislatures for reviewing executive agency rulemaking. 
See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVT’S, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2014, at 118–24 (2014), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states. 
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legislative veto has been deemed unconstitutional either by court 
decision or in an attorney general opinion.  Five of these states had by 
statute authorized joint-resolution vetoes: Alaska,153 West Virginia,154 
New Jersey,155 Kansas,156 and Missouri.157  Two of the states in which 
the legislative veto was deemed unlawful had authorized one-house 
vetoes by statute: Oklahoma158 and Pennsylvania.159  A one-house veto 
was also ruled unlawful in a third state, Massachusetts, though in the 
context of pending rather than enacted legislation.160  And five states 
had authorized legislative committee vetoes: New Hampshire,161 
Kentucky,162 Oregon,163 Michigan,164 and West Virginia (which also 
allowed a veto of agency rulemaking by joint resolution).165  The only 
legislative veto scheme that has affirmatively withstood judicial or 
attorney general scrutiny is Idaho’s, which authorizes a joint resolution 
veto of agency rulemaking.166  Moreover, no scheme authorizing a 
committee to exercise veto powers over agency rulemaking has ever 
 
153. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.320(a), repealed by 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 164, § 7. 
154. W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-12(b) (2016).  This statutory provision authorized the legislature 
to exercise a kind of “pocket veto” if it failed to authorize agency rules by joint resolution.  W. 
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Hechler, 376 S.E.2d 839, 841 (W. Va. 1988). 
155. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4.4 (West 1981) (repealed 2001). 
156. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-426 (West 2015); see also State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of 
Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (1984) (finding previous version of statute unconstitutional 
without presentment to the governor). 
157. There was no single statute in Missouri that authorized these procedures.  Constitutional 
amendments that would have established such procedures were twice defeated.  Nonetheless, 
these requirements were included individually in a series of statutes.  See Mo. Coal. for the Env’t 
v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); see also Dean, 
supra note 33, at 1223–24 n.5 (listing statutes where these review provisions had been inserted). 
158. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 308 (repealed 1995). 
159. 71 PA. CONS. ST. § 745.7 (2016); see also Commonwealth v. Jubelirer, 567 A.2d 741, 
749 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1989), vacated on grounds of mootness 614 A.2d 204, 211 (Pa. 1992) 
(holding the constitutionality issue moot in light of the legislature’s subsequent statutory 
elimination of the one-House veto). 
160. S., 1763, § 29, 1986 Leg. (Mass. 1986); Op. of the Justices, 493 N.E.2d 859 (Mass. 1986) 
(rendering an advisory opinion, at the request of the Senate, concerning the legislative 
certification provisions of section 29 of 1986 Senate Bill 1763). 
161. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:2 (2016); see also Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 
(N.H. 1981) (finding previous version of statute unconstitutional). 
162. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.087 (repealed 1984). 
163. OR. REV. STAT. § 459-298 (repealed 1995). 
164. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.245 to 24.246 (2016); see also Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611 
N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 2000) (finding provisions of previous version of the statute to be 
unconstitutional for lack of compliance with the enactment and presentment requirements of the 
Michigan Constitution). 
165. W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-11. 
166. IDAHO CODE § 67-5291 (2015); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.245 to 24.246. 
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been upheld as constitutional in any jurisdiction, federal or state. 
In each of the states in which the legislative veto has been deemed 
unconstitutional, “separation of powers” problems, broadly speaking, 
are implicated.  Although the constitutional analysis tends to be 
consistent from state to state, there is some nonuniformity in reasoning 
that bears remark. 
The chief problem that the courts (and attorneys general) perceive 
with legislative veto schemes is that the legislature has authorized itself 
to take action in a manner that need not comply with constitutional 
requirements for enacting laws.  Legislatures may only act pursuant to 
their legislative powers,167 which they must exercise in accord with 
constitutional provisions that require passage by a majority of both 
houses of the legislature and presentment of the bill to the governor for 
approval or executive veto.168 
In the states that authorize either a single house of the legislature or a 
legislative committee to kill agency rules, bicameralism failures have 
been fatal to the legislative veto scheme.169  The courts have observed 
that action by a single house undermines much of the point of the 
bicameral system, which was designed to ascertain the legislative will 
 
167. “A resolution is essentially legislative where it affects the legal rights, duties and 
regulations of persons outside the legislative branch and therefore must comply with the 
enactment provisions of the constitution.”  State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of 
Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 638 (Kan. 1984). 
168. See, e.g., Gen. Assembly of State of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 444 (N.J. 1982) (“A 
veto which effectively amends or repeals existing law offends the Constitution because it is 
tantamount to passage of a new law without the approval of the Governor.”). 
169. See Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. 1981) (noting that the “wholesale 
shifting” of legislative authority to small committees violates constitutional provisions requiring 
the House and Senate to act pursuant to a quorum of both bodies, and that the system failed to 
comply with bicameralism requirements); Gilliam Cty. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 
849 P.2d 500, 502, 505 (Or. 1993), rev’d sub nom. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality 
of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (finding scheme that required a joint legislative committee to 
approve agency rules before they became effective was unconstitutional because the veto “was a 
legislative act, and a legislative act by less than a majority of each chamber is unconstitutional”); 
State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 632 (W. Va. 1981); Letter from Michael C. 
Turpen, Attorney Gen. of Okla., to Marvin York, State Sen., Okl. A.G. Opin. No. 86-17, 1986 
WL 235082, at *1–2 (Feb. 24, 1986) (explaining his “relatively simple analysis” was that because 
the only power possessed by the Oklahoma legislature was the legislative power, “which may 
only be exercised bicamerally and with presentment,” Oklahoma’s constitutional system did not 
allow a resolution adopted by a single house “to have the force and effect of law beyond the 
bounds of that house”); cf. Martinez v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d 
582, 586  (Wis. 1992) (finding no constitutional problem with a legislative review scheme in 
which a joint committee was authorized only to recommend that the legislature pass legislation 
through the usual enactment process in order to prevent agency rules from being implemented). 
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by empowering each house with a negative upon the other.170  And 
action by a legislative committee is even more problematic, as it places 
governmental decisions in the hands of such a small portion of the 
legislative body.171 
Statutes that allow a legislative veto only by a joint resolution do not 
face a bicameralism problem, but typically fail because of a failure to 
comply with presentment requirements.  State constitutions require all 
bills to be presented to the governor before becoming enforceable as 
law in order to provide the governor an executive veto that might act as 
a counterweight to the powers of the legislature.172  Because legislative 
veto schemes of all stripes—legislative committee, one-house, or joint 
resolution—are designed precisely to freeze the governor out of the 
process, they have been found not to withstand constitutional scrutiny in 
many states.173 
 
170. Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d at 788. 
171. See, e.g., Barker, 279 S.E.2d at 635 (noting that veto power in the hands of a legislative 
committee “plac[es] the final control over governmental actions in the hands of only a few 
individuals who are answerable only to local electorates”). 
172. See, e.g., State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 772 (Alaska 1980) (explaining 
that the presentment requirement is meant “to preserve the integrity of . . . [the executive] branch 
of government . . . and thus maintain an equilibrium of governmental powers . . . [and] to act as a 
check upon corrupt or hasty and ill-considered legislation” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted; other modifications in original)). 
173. See Stephan, 687 P. 2d at 638 (agreeing with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that “[f]oreclosing the Governor from the law-making process offends the separation 
of powers and the Presentment Clause” and is an “exercise of legislative power that the 
Constitution forbids” (quoting Byrne, 448 A.2d at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted))); Op. 
of the Justices to the Senate, 493 N.E.2d 859, 863–64 (Mass. 1986) (observing that the 
“consensus of both Houses of the Legislature as ‘an open-ended means of regulating the conduct 
of members of the executive branch’ would violate the constitutional provision concerning the 
executive veto” (quoting Op. of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1223 (Mass. 1978))); Mo. Coal. 
for the Env’t v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 134 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (“The 
legislature may not unilaterally control execution of rulemaking authority after its delegation of 
rulemaking power,” but it “may, of course, attempt to control the executive branch by passing 
amendatory or supplemental legislation and presenting such legislation to the governor for 
signature or veto, or by the power of appropriation.”); Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611 N.W.2d 530, 
536 (Mich. 2000) (holding the veto power of JCAR and the legislature to be “inherently 
legislative” and therefore “subject to the enactment and presentment requirements of the 
Michigan Constitution”); Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d at 788 (holding proposed statute would 
violate New Hampshire Constitution part II, article 45, requiring presentment to executive for 
potential veto, because there was “no provision in the proposed bill for laying the rule before the 
chief executive for his approval”); Gilliam, 849 P.2d at 505–06 (noting that a veto is a legislative 
act, and as such must comply with constitutional enactment requirements including presentation 
to the Governor for signing or for return to the legislature with written objections); 
Commonwealth v. Jubelirer, 567 A.2d 741, 749 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (noting that “[n]othing 
less than legislation may suffice to override the rule-making power of . . . [any] executive 
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Occasionally, plaintiffs have challenged legislative review schemes 
as unconstitutional “legislative vetoes” even where by statute the “veto” 
requires passage by majorities of both houses of the legislature and 
presentment to the governor for a potential executive veto.  
Unsurprisingly, the courts have rightly concluded that such schemes are 
not unconstitutional, because the legislatures are authorized to do no 
more than act in conformance with pre-existing constitutional 
enactment requirements.174 
In addition, courts across the nation have rejected arguments that 
legislative veto schemes do in fact comport with bicameralism and 
presentment requirements because the statutes that created the 
legislative vetoes were themselves passed by both houses of the 
legislature and presented to the governor for a veto.  Such an argument, 
if accepted, would allow a legislature by a single piece of legislation to 
relieve itself of the burden of complying with constitutional enactment 
rules.175  As the Alaska Supreme Court observed, such a law “would 
impermissibly preserve legislative power possessed at one instant in 
time for future periods when the legislature might otherwise be 
incapable of acting because of the executive veto.”176  And as the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated, “the Legislature cannot circumvent the 
constitutional requirement of presentment to the Governor merely by 
passing a statute which allows such a procedure.”177 
 
agency,” and observing “serious questions of constitutionality” under state constitutional 
provisions requiring, among other things, “gubernatorial presentment”), vacated on grounds of 
mootness 614 A.2d 204, 211 (Pa. 1992) (holding the issue moot in light of the legislature’s 
subsequent statutory elimination of the one-House veto); Barker, 279 S.E.2d at 632 (noting that 
the legislature could give “the binding effect of law” to its actions “only by following the formal 
enactment process”); Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 583 (upholding a legislative review scheme in 
which legislative action to kill an agency rule required presentment to the executive before taking 
effect, thus proving the statute was “carefully drawn to avoid a separation of powers challenge 
and meets presentment and bicameral requirements”); cf. Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State 
of Cal., 20 P.3d 533, 542 (Cal. 2001) (noting that the legislative review scheme at issue was 
constitutional but that it “would be unconstitutional if it permitted a single house of the 
Legislature to suspend a departmental mandate without . . . presentment to the Governor”). 
174. See, e.g., Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 587 (“The full involvement of both houses of the 
legislature and the governor are critical elements of [the legislative review provisions at issue] 
and these elements distinguish Wisconsin from the statutory schemes found to violate separation 
of powers doctrines in other states.”); Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 542 (holding that a legislative 
review scheme was constitutional because it required bicameralism and presentment). 
175. See, e.g., A.L.I.V.E., 606 P.2d at 779 (“In other words, by virtue of one enactment 
approved by the governor, the legislature can free itself, in certain instances, of the constitutional 
constraints that would otherwise govern its actions.”). 
176. Id. 
177. Byrne, 448 A.2d at 446; see also Stephan, 687 P.2d at 638 (“The legislature cannot pass 
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Thus far, this Section has discussed bicameralism and presentment 
problems as implicating the separation-of-powers doctrine broadly.  
And to be sure, the presentment requirement in particular is integral to 
state constitutional schemes as a way of assuring proper checks and 
balances between the political branches.  When a statute authorizes 
legislative action without allowing the governor a chance to veto the 
action, it is fair to say that separation-of-powers principles have been 
undermined. 
But there is another way in which separation-of-powers concerns 
might lead a court to view legislative veto schemes with suspicion.  
Where one branch of government exercises authority over a function 
belonging to another branch—including authority explicitly delegated 
by the constitution—there may be a stand-alone separation-of-powers 
violation.  With respect to legislative vetoes, the argument would be that 
legislative interference with agency rulemaking intrudes on the powers 
of the executive branch and therefore violates state constitutional 
separation-of-powers principles, whether they are explicitly written into 
the state constitution or not. 
This stand-alone separation-of-powers argument is a difficult one.  
First, it is far from clear that legislative interference with agency 
rulemaking can be characterized as interference with executive powers, 
as the power to promulgate rules that will have the force of law belongs 
initially with the legislature and can only be exercised by an 
administrative agency if the power is delegated to them.  As such, the 
rulemaking power is probably best characterized as legislative or quasi-
legislative in nature.178  Second, even if the agency’s rulemaking power 
is assumed to be executive in nature,179 separation-of-powers provisions 
do not and could not require absolute segregation of functions between 
the branches.180  Only where one branch seeks to exercise power over a 
 
an act that allows it to violate the constitution.” (citing Byrne, 448 A.2d at 438)). 
178. “It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the 
operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 118, at 255 (James Madison). 
179. See, e.g., Stephan, 687 P.2d at 635; see also Byrne, 448 A.2d at 443 (demurring over the 
question of whether agency rules are legislative or executive in nature, noting that in “their effects 
on private conduct, the types of commands embodied in executive rules may not differ greatly 
from those in many statutes”). 
180. See, e.g., Byrne, 448 A.2d at 439 (“[L]egislative cooperation with the Executive does not 
always unduly intrude upon the Executive’s power to enforce the law.  In many situations 
‘responsibility is joint and governmental powers must be shared and exercised by the branches on 
a complementary basis if the ultimate governmental objective is to be achieved.’” (quoting 
Knight v. Margate, 431 A.2d 833, 840–41 (N.J. 1981))). 
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core function of another branch, or over a function that has been 
explicitly delegated to another branch by the state constitution, will 
there be a significant separation-of-powers issue.  Legislative vetoes of 
agency rulemaking, therefore, are not likely candidates for stand-alone 
separation-of-powers violations.181 
But occasionally courts have found that the adoption of regulations is 
an executive function,182 and they have sometimes concluded that 
legislative review of regulations would constitute “a legislative 
encroachment into the power of the executive branch.”183  In the end, 
these courts have concluded that the legislative veto is unconstitutional, 
though for reasons that are not as compelling as in those cases in which 
bicameralism and presentment were identified as the chief constitutional 
problems. 
As mentioned earlier, in just a single state has a high court embraced 
the constitutionality of legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking.  In 
Mead v. Arnell, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a statutory scheme 
whereby agency rules—whether already in effect or just proposed—
could be nullified by means of a concurrent resolution adopted by both 
the House and Senate of the Idaho Legislature.184  The court, divided 
three to two, premised its conclusion that the legislative veto entailed no 
 
181. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. 1981) (noting, on the way toward 
holding the particular legislative veto scheme at issue in the case to be unconstitutional, that 
because the rulemaking authority of agencies “derives solely from that power which the 
legislature delegates to them, . . . the creation of a legislative veto is not per se unconstitutional”); 
Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State of Cal., 20 P.3d 533, 541 (Cal. 2001) (“[W]e believe that a 
legislative enactment that limits the mandate of an administrative agency or withdraws certain of 
its powers is not necessarily suspect under the doctrine of separation of powers.”). 
182. See, e.g., Stephan, 687 P.2d at 635 (“[T]he power to adopt rules and regulations is 
essentially executive or administrative in nature, not legislative.”); Commonwealth v. Jubelirer, 
567 A.2d 741, 749 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), vacated on grounds of mootness 614 A.2d 204 (Pa. 
1992) (holding the legislative veto interfered with the executive’s responsibility to administer the 
law, and stating that “[n]othing less than legislation may suffice to override the rule-making 
power of . . . [any] executive agency”). 
183. Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 919 (Ky. 1984); Mo. Coal. for 
the Env’t v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 133 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (finding 
that the legislative veto scheme “goes well beyond any incidental overlap of powers” and 
“violates constitutional principles concerning the separation of executive and legislative 
functions” by allowing the legislature to unconstitutionally interfere with executive action).  The 
Kentucky Supreme Court also concluded that the legislature encroached on judicial functions by 
exercising a legislative veto, since the legislative review of the rules was to determine whether 
they comported with statutory authority and carried out legislative intent.  “It requires no citation 
of authority to state unequivocally that such a determination is a judicial matter and is within the 
purview of the judiciary . . . .”  Legislative Research Comm’n, 664 S.W.2d at 919. 
184. Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410, 412 (Idaho 1990) (discussing IDAHO CODE § 67-5218). 
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separation-of-powers problem on the fact that an administrative 
agency’s power to issue rules and regulations was a delegation of power 
to the executive rather than an inherent constitutional power.185  Thus, 
for example, there might be a separation-of-powers issue if the 
legislature by concurrent resolution had instead attempted “to prevent 
the Attorney General from taking legal action for some violation of a 
statute,” because “enforcing the law of this state is a constitutionally 
mandated executive department function resting in the office of the 
Attorney General.”186  In contrast, the legislative veto of agency rules is 
an exercise of power over “a legislative delegation of power [that] is 
neither the legal nor functional equivalent of constitutional power.”187 
Thus far the court’s opinion is unobjectionable (though as discussed 
above, not all state high courts would agree with either its premises or 
conclusions).  More problematic is that the majority in Mead never 
forthrightly explained why it believed the legislature could kill agency 
rules through a joint resolution rather than through the ordinary 
lawmaking enactment process.  As Justice Bistline explained in dissent, 
the issue was “whether the Idaho Legislature may, by resolution, 
rescind the rules promulgated by an executive department or 
agency . . . .  If the issue were whether the legislature could do so by 
enactment, there would be no need to take pen in hand.”188 
The conclusion to be reached from this survey of federal and state 
law is that the chief objection of the courts and attorneys general to the 
legislative veto is that it allows the legislature to exercise power over 
the executive branch without complying with constitutional restrictions 
on the manner in which it may act.  While stand-alone separation-of-
powers violations are sometimes discerned by jurists, far more 
 
185. Id. at 415 (“[W]e have consistently found the origin of this rule making capacity in a 
delegation from the legislature not a constitutional grant of power to the executive and have 
consistently held such rules or regulations promulgated hereunder to be less than the equivalent of 
statutory law.”). 
186. Id. at 417. 
187. Id.  Of course, in such a situation the legislature would presumably be acting in violation 
of separation-of-powers principles even if it were to pass a statute, consistent with constitutional 
bicameralism and presentment requirements, that purported to prevent the Attorney General from 
taking legal action for the violation of a statute. 
188. Id. at 427 (Bistline, J., dissenting); see also id. at 428 (reciting history of joint and 
concurrent resolution in the state and noting earlier court holding that “the force and effect of 
joint resolutions or concurrent resolutions is just that much, advisory or recommendatory, but 
nothing more”); id. at 422–23 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that 
if the legislature believes an agency is misusing authority, it should act by amending the statute to 
redefine the agency’s authority or else rescind it altogether by following the procedures for 
legislation set forth in the state constitution). 
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problematic is the legislature’s attempt to short-circuit executive 
oversight of its powers to kill agency rulemaking.189 
III.  JCAR AND THE LEGISLATIVE VETO IN ILLINOIS 
The lawfulness of legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking has not yet 
been addressed in Illinois.190  But when a proper case is ready for 
adjudication by the courts, there is every reason to believe that such 
vetoes will be deemed unlawful under the Illinois Constitution, just as 
they have been in the federal and most other state systems. 
To be sure, decisions from federal and state courts concerning the 
constitutionality of legislative vetoes in their own jurisdictions are in no 
way binding on the Illinois courts, which alone are responsible for 
interpreting the requirements of the Illinois Constitution.191  But 
decisions from other jurisdictions have persuasive value, and are 
unlikely to be discounted altogether by the Illinois courts when a case 
properly raising the legislative veto question is before them.192 
 
189. Most academic commentators likewise believe legislative vetoes, unless specifically 
authorized by a state’s constitution, are unlawful.  See, e.g., ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 498 (1986) (“In the absence of a constitutional provision 
expressly authorizing such action, nonstatutory legislative vetoes or suspensions of particular 
agency rules are probably impermissible under most state constitutions.”); Dean, supra note 33, at 
1157 (calling the legislative veto a “constitutional virus”). 
190. In cases where JCAR review of agency rulemaking was challenged, the legislative veto 
was never properly before the court.  See, e.g., Quinn v. Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ill. 
1985) (noting that the issue of an “illegal legislative veto of an executive action . . . is not before 
us”); Reece v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 767 N.E.2d 395, 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that 
“the issue of whether [a contested] action would constitute a legislative veto is not before us”). 
191. “[W]here Federal questions are not involved, as where State constitutions and statutes are 
to be construed, State courts are not required to follow Federal court decisions although they may 
be persuasive.”  Ray Sch.-Chi., Inc. v. Cummins, 146 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ill. 1957) (citations 
omitted); see also Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 613 (1937) (“[A] 
judgment by the highest court of a state as to the meaning and effect of its own constitution is 
decisive and controlling everywhere.”); Relsolelo v. Fisk, 760 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Ill. 2001) (“[W]e 
are not bound to interpret our own constitutional provisions lockstep with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the federal constitution.”).  Jim Rossi has noted generally that “[a]lthough many 
describe state courts as adopting a deferential position towards, and rarely deviating from, federal 
constitutional doctrine, in the separation of powers context the approach of many state courts, 
echoing Antifederalist ideals, contrasts starkly with the approach of federal courts.”  Rossi, supra 
note 34, at 1189 (footnote omitted). 
192. In addition, a court analyzing the lawfulness of JCAR and General Assembly provisions 
for review of agency rulemaking will begin with the proposition that the General Assembly’s 
statutes are presumed to be constitutional.  People v. La Pointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 352 (Ill. 1981).  
The burden would be on the party challenging the validity of the statute to “demonstrate clearly a 
constitutional violation.”  People v. Wilson, 827 N.E.2d 416, 419–20 (Ill. 2005); see also 
Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce v. Pappas, 880 N.E.2d 1105, 1117 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) 
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This Part will analyze the constitutionality of JCAR and General 
Assembly scheme for reviewing agency rulemaking.  It will focus 
primarily on the text of the Illinois Constitution and its separation-of-
powers, bicameralism, and presentment requirements.193  In doing so, it 
will take account of the unique history of the Illinois Constitution, 
judicial precedent that might bear on the legitimacy of legislative vetoes 
in the state, and persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions.  The first 
Section will assess whether legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking 
represent a stand-alone violation of the separation-of-powers clause.  It 
will focus primarily on whether such a scheme encroaches on the 
executive branch’s powers, with a conclusion that it does not.  The 
Section will also entertain the argument that JCAR and General 
Assembly vetoes encroach on judicial powers, and will conclude that 
there is some merit to this contention.  The second Section will address 
the enactment provisions of the Illinois Constitution—including most 
particularly the bicameralism and presentment requirements—and will 
conclude, in accord with almost all other jurisdictions, that the 
legislative veto is incompatible with such provisions.  This Section will 
also assess and reject the argument that because the legislation that 
created JCAR and General Assembly veto provisions were themselves 
passed in accord with constitutional enactment requirements, legislative 
vetoes are constitutional.  A final Section will assess the importance of 
House Bill 398, which by its terms would seem to require the cessation 
of all future rulemaking by agencies if the courts invalidate the state’s 
legislative veto review schemes. 
A.  Separation-of-Powers Issues 
The Illinois Constitution is not a minor league version of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Although it is similar in structure to the federal 
Constitution and to many state constitutions, it has its own history and 
its own operative language.  To take an example, the U.S. Constitution 
has no “separation-of-powers” clause, while the first section of Article 
II of the Illinois Constitution states: “The legislative, executive and 
judicial branches are separate.  No branch shall exercise powers 
properly belonging to another.”194 
 
(“Moreover, courts will construe statutes, if possible, to be constitutional.”). 
193. In doing so, it is worth noting preliminarily that in Illinois the courts must construe a 
statute so as to “affirm the statute’s constitutionality and validity, if reasonably possible.”  People 
v. Hammond, 2011 IL 110044, ¶ 55. 
194. ILL. CONST. art. II § 1.  The modern language was first adopted in 1941, but reflects in 
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There have been four constitutions since Illinois became a state in 
1818, and the trend over time in the documents has been to weaken the 
powers of the legislative branch.  Broadly speaking, the original 1818 
constitution was drafted and adopted in a time of distrust of the 
executive branch and popular apprehension about powers wielded by 
colonial and, later, territorial governors.  The document was designed to 
reflect that the legislature, as the true and most direct embodiment of the 
popular will, was the chief repository of government power.195  The 
Governor was thus granted limited powers by this first constitution.  
Rather than possessing a veto over bills passed by the legislature, for 
example, the constitution provided that the Governor and the members 
of the Illinois Supreme Court would sit as a “council of revision,” 
indicating whether or not they approved or disapproved of legislation 
that was about to take effect as law.  Any disapproved legislation would 
be returned to the General Assembly, which could then pass it into law 
by a simple majority vote.196 
At the time of the formation of the second Illinois Constitution of 
1848, however, legislative excesses in the state and a new Jacksonian 
faith in strong executive leadership led to a modified constitutional 
scheme.  Legislative powers were somewhat restricted in the new 
constitution, and the “council of revision” scheme was replaced with a 
straight-up gubernatorial veto, though this veto could still be overridden 
by a simple majority vote of the General Assembly.197  In the third 
Illinois Constitution of 1870, however, this gubernatorial veto was 
 
substance the original provision from the original constitution in 1818.  See ILL. CONST. of 1818, 
art. I (“The powers of the government of the State of Illinois, shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, and each of them be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which 
are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judiciary, to 
another.  No person, or collection of persons, being one of those departments, shall exercise any 
power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or 
permitted.”). 
195. See JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818–1970, at 12 (1972).  
In the federal system, the government is limited in its powers to only those granted by the 
Constitution.  See Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited Government Theory of 
Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 642–45 (2007) (discussing limited 
government and collecting major scholarship on the doctrine).  In Illinois, by contrast, the 
legislature is presumed to already possess all governmental powers, and the state constitution 
works to limit its powers.  See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper, The State Constitution: Its Nature and 
Purpose, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3, at 13 ( 
Victoria Ranney ed., 1970). 
196. WALTER F. DODD & DUE HUTCHISON DODD, GOVERNMENT IN ILLINOIS 56–57 (1923); 
Kauper, supra note 195 at 13; ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION 4 (2011). 
197. CORNELIUS, supra note 195, at 35; DODD & DODD, supra note 196, at 56; LOUSIN, supra 
note 196, at 9. 
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strengthened by requiring a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for 
an override.198 
The gubernatorial veto requirement remains the constitutional 
scheme today, under the fourth and current Illinois Constitution of 
1970, though now the General Assembly may override the veto by vote 
of three-fifths of each house.199  In addition, the current constitution 
gives the governor a variety of types of vetoes to exercise, including a 
veto over an entire bill, a line-item veto, the ability to reduce the amount 
of an item, and the ability to propose revisions to bills already passed 
that the legislature can accept or reject.200  In sum, one central dynamic 
of the Illinois Constitution since 1819 has been its transformation from 
a document recognizing the primacy of the legislative branch to one that 
has increasingly sought to restrain the General Assembly by 
strengthening the veto power of the Governor.201 
The separation-of-powers provision of the Illinois Constitution—both 
in its original form and in its current incarnation—has never been 
understood to require absolute segregation of powers among the three 
branches of government.  In 1839, Chief Justice Wilson explained that 
while the separation-of-powers language was “a declaration of a 
fundamental principle,” it was nonetheless “to be understood in a 
limited and qualified sense.”202  It fundamentally meant that all of one 
branch’s powers cannot be subsumed by another branch.  The provision  
does not mean that the legislative, executive, and judicial power 
should be kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no 
connection or dependence, the one upon the other; but its true 
meaning, both in theory and practice, is, that the whole power of two 
or more of these departments shall not be lodged in the same hands, 
whether of one or many.203  
These sentiments have been confirmed repeatedly in Illinois case law 
up to the present era.204 
 
198. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 5, § 16; see also LOUSIN, supra note 196, at 13. 
199. ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 9. 
200. LOUSIN, supra note 196, at 33. 
201. See, e.g., FRANK KOPECKY & MARY SHERMAN HARRIS, UNDERSTANDING THE ILLINOIS 
CONSTITUTION 2 (2000). 
202. Field v. People, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79, 83–84 (1839) (Wilson, C.J.) (construing same 
provision but with earlier constitutional language). 
203. Id. 
204. See Pucinski v. Cty. of Cook, 737 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. 2000) (separation-of-powers 
clause “does not create rigid boundaries prohibiting every exercise of functions by one branch of 
government which ordinarily are exercised by another”); Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 
1051 (Ill. 1997) (purpose is not to “achieve a complete divorce between the branches of 
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As far back as 1910, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that 
administrative officers “are frequently charged with duties that partake 
of the character of all three of the departments, but which cannot be 
classed as belonging essentially to either.”205  For example, 
administrative officers “are frequently called upon, in the performance 
of their duties, to exercise judgment and discretion, to investigate, 
deliberate, and decide, and yet it has been held that they do not exercise 
judicial power, within the meaning of the constitutional provision.”206  
Nonetheless, each branch of government holds powers that substantially 
belong to that branch and that cannot be exercised by a coordinate 
branch without implicating the separation-of-powers provision of the 
Illinois Constitution.  Even though complete separation is neither 
expected nor desired, “[e]ach branch of government has its own unique 
sphere of authority that cannot be exercised by another branch.”207 
While the Illinois Constitution itself does not define the powers of the 
three branches,208 the Illinois Supreme Court has broadly defined the 
 
government”); Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 92 N.E. 814, 833 (Ill. 1910) (branches cannot “be 
kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no connection or interdependence.”); Field, 3 Ill. 
(2 Scam.) at 84 (provisions on separation of powers should only be read as a “broad theoretical 
line of demarcation, between the great departments of government”); see also DAVID R. MILLER, 
1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: ANNOTATED FOR LEGISLATORS 19 (4th ed. 2005) (giving 
examples of power overlaps, including General Assembly holding witnesses in contempt and 
impeaching state officers). 
205. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 92 N.E. at 833.  For a description of the variety of ways in which the 
Illinois Constitution explicitly authorizes individual branches to exercise powers that would 
conventionally be thought to belong to coordinate branches, see DODD & DODD, supra note 196, 
at 102–04 (discussing impeachment proceedings of a “purely judicial” character designated by 
the constitution to the House); see also SAMUEL K. GOVE ET AL., THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE: 
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 2 (1976) (“Although the lines separating each of the three branches of 
state government have never been completely clear, the essential responsibility of the General 
Assembly has always been that of enacting statute law.” (citation omitted)). 
206. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 92 N.E. at 833. 
207. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078 (Ill. 1997) (citing Burleigh v. 
Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357 (Ill. 1997)) (holding invalid an attempted delegation of an executive or 
administrative function to the judicial branch); Fields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 645 
N.E.2d 946 (Ill. 1994) (holding invalid attempted delegation of legislative decision making to the 
judiciary); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 744 (Ill. 1976) (holding 
invalid an attempted delegation of judicial power to nonjudicial member of medical malpractice 
review board); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ill. 1952) (“If the power is 
judicial in its nature, it necessarily follows that the legislature is expressly prohibited from 
exercising it.”). 
208. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078 (noting that “our state constitution does not define legislative, 
executive, and judicial power” (citing People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 892 (Ill. 1988))); 
People v. Hammond, 959 N.E.2d 29, 44 (Ill. 2011) (citing Walker, 519 N.E. at 893); Witter v. 
Cook Cty. Comm’rs, 100 N.E. 148, 149 (Ill. 1912) (“[O]ur constitution does not attempt to define 
legislative, executive and judicial power, as it is neither practicable nor possible to enumerate the 
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legislative power as “the power to enact laws or declare what the laws 
shall be”;209 the executive power as “that power which compels 
obedience to the laws and executes them”;210 and the judicial power as 
“the power which adjudicates upon the rights of citizens, and to that end 
construes and applies the law.”211  Notwithstanding these superficially 
clear categories, determining precisely when one branch exercises 
power that intrudes on the prerogatives of another branch can be a 
difficult undertaking.  In fact, there have been very few Illinois court 
decisions addressing separation-of-powers challenges.212 
In sum, the history and structure of the Illinois Constitution indicates 
that over time the dominant powers of the legislative branch have been 
scaled back significantly, and that the current constitution’s provision 
for broad executive veto powers indicates the citizenry’s desire for 
balanced powers between the political branches and among all branches 
of the government.  It is this constitutional fine balancing that the 
legislative veto threatens to throw out of whack. 
1.  No Encroachment on Executive Powers.  
The Illinois courts are unlikely to deem legislative interference with 
agency rulemaking to be a stand-alone violation of the separation-of-
powers language of section one of Article II of the Illinois Constitution.  
The chief reason is that rulemaking powers have never been 
characterized by the state courts as purely “executive” in nature, nor is 
there anything in the state constitution that specifically delegates 
rulemaking powers to the executive branch.  Moreover, there is no 
reason to believe that historically the rulemaking power has been a core 
executive function either in Illinois or in other jurisdictions.  To the 
contrary, rulemaking power has been described by the Illinois courts as 
“quasi-legislative” in nature, because the authority to makes rules has 
been delegated by the legislature and the rules themselves have the 
 
myriad powers of government and to declare that a given power belongs exclusively to one 
branch for all time.”); see also id. (“[A]rticle 3 of the Illinois Constitution does not mean that the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers shall be kept so entirely dependent upon each other.”). 
209. People v. Hawkinson, 155 N.E. 318, 319 (Ill. 1927). 
210. Witter, 100 N.E. at 149. 
211. Hawkinson, 155 N.E. at 319. 
212. See LOUSIN, supra note 196, at 81 (cases “involving alleged encroachments by the 
legislative branch upon the executive branch or vice versa are especially rare”); see also id. 
(noting that such challenges frequently involve allegations that the legislature improperly 
delegated legislative authority to the executive). 
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force of law.213 
In addition, administrative agencies possess the authority to create 
rules only because the legislature has delegated that power to them. 
While administrative agencies are part of the executive branch, they are 
creatures of statute and have no power beyond their enabling statutes.  
“It is fundamental that an administrative body has only such powers as 
are granted in the statute creating it.”214  Although the enforcement of 
rules is inherently an executive function,215 there is nothing inherently 
executive about the promulgation of rules.  Indeed, the typical 
complaint of parties aggrieved by agency rules is that the agency 
violated separation-of-powers principles by exercising legislative 
power.216 
The suggestion that JCAR or General Assembly interference with 
agency rulemaking—whether through a legislative veto or (equally 
 
213. Radaszewski v. Garner, 805 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); see also Monsanto Co. 
v. Pollution Control Bd., 367 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ill. 1977) (referring to an agency’s “quasi-
legislative power to make prospective regulations and orders”); Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Ill. 
Pollution Control Bd., 684 N.E.2d 837, 840–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“When an administrative 
agency such as the [Illinois Pollution Control] Board exercises its rulemaking powers, it is 
performing a quasi-legislative function” (citing Ill. State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution 
Control Bd., 532 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988))); Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ill. Commerce 
Comm’n, 644 N.E.2d 817, 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[T]he administrative rules and regulations 
[the Illinois Commerce Commission] promulgates, acting in its quasi-legislative capacity, enjoy a 
presumption of validity.”).  As Chief Justice Roberts observed recently about administrative 
agencies generally, they fit “most comfortably within the Executive Branch,” but “as a practical 
matter they exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of law.”  City 
of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief 
Justice’s point was that administrative agencies exercise an amalgam of powers, and he went on 
to explain that the agencies also exercise “executive power, by policing compliance with those 
regulations; and judicial power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on 
those found to have violated their rules.”  Id. 
214. People ex rel. Thompson v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 317 N.E.2d 121, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1974). 
215. S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
216. It is “well settled” that the General Assembly may delegate rulemaking authority to an 
administrative agency, so long as it “establishes standards under which the agency’s discretion 
may be exercised.”  S. 51 Development Corp., 781 N.E.2d at 535 (citing Sch. Dist. No. 79 v. Cty. 
Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Lake Cty., 123 N.E.2d 475, 476 (Ill. 1954)); see also Hoogasian v. Reg’l 
Transp. Agency, 317 N.E.2d 534, 541 (Ill. 1974) (“It is well settled that notwithstanding the rule 
that the General Assembly cannot delegate its general legislative power to others, it may 
authorize others to do things which it might properly do but cannot do as understandingly or as 
advantageously itself, if the authority thus granted is delimited by intelligible standards.”); Dep’t 
of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 95 N.E.2d 903, 906 (Ill. 1950) (stating it is 
“well settled” that the General Assembly may “delegate its powers to an administrative agency, as 
long as it does not invest such agency with arbitrary powers, or delegate its general legislative 
authority.”). 
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plausibly) through legislation passed pursuant to ordinary constitutional 
enactment provisions—is an encroachment on executive powers that 
represents a stand-alone separation-of-powers violation would seem to 
be a nonstarter.  Of course, it is a different question whether the 
legislature interfered with an agency’s rulemaking authority in a 
constitutionally proper manner.  That is a question to be addressed in 
Part III.B, below. 
2.  Probable Encroachment on Judicial Powers. 
Although it seems clear that legislative interference with agency 
rulemaking does not encroach on executive powers, it is a more difficult 
question whether the legislative veto scheme currently in place in 
Illinois encroaches on judicial powers.  That is because JCAR and the 
General Assembly are authorized to block implementation of agency 
rules upon concluding, among other possibilities, that the agency has 
acted beyond its authority in promulgating its rules,217 which is a 
determination that would seem to be inherently judicial in nature. 
Broadly speaking, in the “context of the interplay between the 
legislature and the judiciary,” the separation-of-powers provision “has 
been interpreted to mean that it is the legislature’s role to make the law, 
and the judiciary’s role to interpret the law.”218  Although there have 
been few Illinois cases addressing separation-of-powers issues between 
the legislative and executive branches, there are many instances where 
the courts have concluded that the legislature had sought to exercise 
judicial power in violation of the separation-of-powers provision of the 
Illinois Constitution.219  For example, the courts have found legislative 
encroachment when the General Assembly passed legislation that 
 
217. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-110(a) (2016) (“The Joint Committee shall examine any 
proposed rule . . . to determine whether the proposed rule . . . is within the statutory authority 
upon which it is based.”). 
218. Bates v. Bd. of Educ., 555 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1990) (citing Roth v. Yackley, 396 N.E.2d 
520 (Ill. 1979)). 
219. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078 (Ill. 1997)(“In furtherance of 
the authority of the judiciary to carry out its constitutional obligations, the legislature is 
prohibited from enacting laws that unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of judges.” (citations 
omitted)); see also People v. Davis, 442 N.E.2d 855, 857–58 (Ill. 1982) (“The General Assembly 
has the power to enact laws governing judicial practice only where they do not unduly infringe 
upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.” (citing Strukoff v. Strukoff, 389 N.E.2d 1170 (Ill. 
1979))); id. at 858 (“Furthermore, it is the undisputed duty of the court to protect its judicial 
powers from encroachment by legislative enactments, and thus preserve an independent judicial 
department.” (citing Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713 (Ill. 1952))); People v. Callopy, 
192 N.E. 634 (Ill. 1934)). 
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allowed the prosecution and defense in criminal trials to question 
prospective jurors,220 that created a special panel of circuit judges to 
decide election contests,221 and that set the conditions under which a 
convict could go free on bail during appellate proceedings.222 
It is, of course, the archetype of the judicial function to declare what 
the law is and to apply the law to disputes in front of the court.223  
Determining whether or not an agency has acted beyond its authority in 
promulgating a rule is certainly part of the judicial power, and it is one 
that has been exercised by the Illinois courts on many occasions.224  But 
it does not follow from these observations that the General Assembly 
(or a committee of the legislature) necessarily encroaches on the judicial 
powers when it exercises its statutory authority to review the lawfulness 
of agency regulations.225 
Consider that the General Assembly may disapprove of the manner in 
which an administrative agency is engaged in its rulemaking, perhaps 
because the legislative body believes the agency has misunderstood the 
authority granted to it by its enabling legislation.  If the General 
Assembly, consistent with the enactment provisions of the Illinois 
Constitution, passes a statute clarifying, modifying, or eliminating 
altogether the agency’s authority to pass such rules, there can be no 
doubt that it is properly exercising its legislative authority, even if what 
motivated the statutory enactment was the legislature’s conclusion that 
the agency had acted unlawfully. 
Nonetheless, legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking are not 
comparable to legislation that amends or corrects statutory grants of 
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies.  To be lawful, statutory 
modifications must be prospective in effect, and may not be used to 
overrule a court’s interpretation of the agency’s authority under the 
 
220. People v. Jackson, 371 N.E.2d 602, 603–04 (Ill. 1977). 
221. In re Contest of Election for Offices of Governor & Lieutenant Governor, 444 N.E.2d 
170, 172 (Ill. 1983). 
222. People v. Williams, 577 N.E.2d 762, 764–65 (Ill. 1991). 
223. Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338, 356 (1917) (“The province of courts is to declare what the 
law is, and apply it to the controversy before them.”). 
224. See, e.g., People v. Roos, 514 N.E.2d 993, 998 (Ill. 1987) (holding that a Department of 
Registration and Education rule prohibiting licenses to acupuncturists was void); Cent. Ill. Pub. 
Serv. v. Commerce Comm’n, 644 N.E.2d 817, 821–23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Granite City Div. of 
Nat’l Steel Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 613 N.E.2d 719, 724–25 (Ill. 1993). 
225. Though when confronted with this question, the Kentucky Supreme Court thought the 
answer was obvious: “It requires no citation of authority to state unequivocally that such a 
determination is a judicial matter and is within the purview of the judiciary.”  Legis. Research 
Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 919 (Ky. 1984). 
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original statute.226  As the Illinois Supreme Court has explained, 
although “the General Assembly can pass legislation to prospectively 
change a judicial construction of a statute if it believes that the judicial 
interpretation was at odds with legislative intent, it cannot effect a 
change in that construction by a later declaration of what it had 
originally intended.”227  In other words, the General Assembly may not, 
after the courts have interpreted a statute, on its own declare what the 
correct interpretation of the statute is. 
The JCAR or General Assembly veto arguably invites the legislature 
to intrude on the judicial power in a similar manner.  It is true that a 
legislative veto is unlikely to be issued on the ground that an agency has 
acted beyond its statutory authority if a state court has already 
determined that the agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority is 
correct.  But whenever a legislative body issues a veto it will 
nonetheless be supplanting the court in the first instance by determining 
the proper construction of the enabling statute.  The legislature will, in 
short, be sitting in judgment on the agency’s interpretation of the 
statutory authority granted to it by the legislature. 
Determining whether agency action was authorized by statute is the 
essence of what judges do.  Challenges to agency rules and regulations 
are decided by the courts in the same manner as challenges to statutes; 
they “must be construed under the same standards which govern 
construction of statutes” and they “enjoy a presumption of validity,” just 
as statutes do.228  Legislatures, in contrast, pass laws rather than pass 
judgment on whether those laws are being interpreted and executed 
properly. 
It should be of no consequence that members of JCAR or of the 
General Assembly believe themselves to have more insight into the 
intent of the drafters of a statute that delegated rulemaking authority to 
an agency.  Neither the General Assembly as a whole, nor a small 
subset of its members, stands in a more authoritative position than the 
courts to determine the legislative intent behind a statute, particularly 
where the statute that is being examined was passed by a prior assembly 
of the legislature.229 
In addition, allowing JCAR or the General Assembly to supplant the 
 
226. Bates v. Bd. of Educ., 555 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1990). 
227. Id. (citing Roth v. Yackley, 396 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. 1979)). 
228. N. Ill. Auto Wreckers & Rebuilders Ass’n v. Dixon, 387 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ill. 1979). 
229. Cf. Legislative Research Comm’n, 664 S.W.2d at 919. 
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judiciary in determining whether agencies are properly exercising 
statutory authority would grant the legislature a windfall of power.  The 
General Assembly would be in a position to make broad and 
nonspecific grants of authority to agencies, secure in knowing that it 
could at a later date lessen its delegation of authority to the executive 
branch through a narrowing interpretation of the statute.  In contrast, the 
courts show great deference to agency interpretations of their enabling 
statutes,230 exercising what in the federal system is called “Chevron 
deference,”231 and deferring to the agency staff’s expertise and 
experience.232  Thus, “administrative action taken under statutory 
authority will not be set aside [by the courts] unless it has been clearly 
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.”233 
 
230. The mobius-like question of whether the courts in Illinois should, consistent with 
separation-of-powers principles, show deference to the determination by a state agency that the 
General Assembly has delegated particular powers to that agency is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  A similar debate is simmering in the federal system now over whether the federal courts 
owe Chevron deference to agency conclusions about the scope of delegations to the agency by 
congressional statutes.  See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (characterizing the issue in the case as “whether the authority of administrative 
agencies should be augmented . . . to include not only broad power to give definitive answers to 
questions left to them by Congress, but also the same power to decide when Congress has given 
them that power”).  The Illinois courts, in contrast, are clear at present that it is the role of the 
judiciary rather than an agency to determine the legitimate scope of the agency’s statutory 
authority.  See People v. Roos, 514 N.E.2d 993, 997 (Ill. 1987) (“Although courts give substantial 
weight and deference to an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with the 
administration and enforcement of the statute, such interpretations are not binding on the 
courts.”); People ex rel. Thompson v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 317 N.E.2d 121, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1974) (“Where the authority of an administrative body is in question the determination of the 
scope of its power and authority is a judicial function; not a question to be finally determined by 
the administrative agency itself.”). 
231. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984). 
232. The courts give agency interpretations of rulemaking authority deference because they 
have been “appointed by law and informed by experience.”  Monarch Gas Co. v. Ill. Commerce 
Comm’n, 366 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
233. Ill. Coal Operators Ass’n v. Pollution Control Bd., 319 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ill. 1974) 
(upholding the Pollution Control Board’s sound-emission regulations where the court could not 
conclude they were clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious); see also Monsanto Co. v. 
Pollution Control Bd., 367 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ill. 1977) (“When a regulation is promulgated by an 
agency pursuant to a grant of legislative power, a reviewing court should not substitute its 
judgment as to the content of the regulation, because the legislature has placed the power to create 
such regulations in the agency and not in the court.” (citation omitted)); Midwest Petroleum 
Marketers Ass’n v. City of Chi., 402 N.E.2d 709, 715 (Ill. 1980) (“A reviewing court may set 
aside administrative regulations only if they are clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”); 
Rend Lake Coll. Fed’n of Teachers v. Bd. of Cmty. Coll., 405 N.E.2d 364, 368 (Ill. 1980) 
(“Reviewing courts may interfere with the construction and application of regulations only where 
administrative interpretation is plainly erroneous.”); Bio-Medical Labs, Inc. v. Trainor, 370 
N.E.2d 223, 233 (Ill. 1977).  The IAPA includes a provision for judicial review of agency 
adjudications.  735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-110 (2016) (“The findings and conclusions of the 
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It should likewise be of no consequence that judicial powers can in 
certain circumstances be exercised by the executive and legislative 
branches.  Certainly, administrative agencies not only exercise “quasi-
legislative” power when promulgating rules, but also “quasi-judicial” 
power when adjudicating enforcement actions for those who are alleged 
to have violated their rules.234  The General Assembly likewise 
exercises power that is judicial in nature, such as when it hosts 
impeachment proceedings.  But the exercise of the impeachment and 
trial power is constitutionally delegated to the legislature,235 and 
therefore represents no separation-of-powers problem.  In contrast, 
sitting in judgment of agency interpretations of statutory grants would 
seem to encroach on core judicial functions and therefore would be 
unconstitutional. 
B.  Enactment Issues 
The conclusion thus far is that the Illinois legislative veto scheme is 
unlikely to be deemed by the courts to represent an encroachment on 
executive branch powers as a stand-alone separation-of-powers 
violation, but that the scheme may allow unconstitutional legislative 
encroachment on the judiciary’s powers.  To be sure, the latter issue is 
in particular a difficult one.  But it is unlikely that the Illinois courts 
would need to consider either of the stand-alone separation-of-powers 
arguments, because it is abundantly clear that JCAR and General 
Assembly vetoes are unlawful due to their failure to comply with 
Illinois constitutional enactment provisions. 
Legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking by either a three-fifths vote 
of JCAR or a joint resolution of the General Assembly should be 
 
administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.”); see 
Winakor v. Annunzio, 99 N.E.2d 191, 197 (Ill. 1951) (“[I]t is fundamental that an erroneous 
construction of a statute by an administrative agency is not binding upon the courts.”).  But it 
does not include a provision for the review of agency rules, leaving the courts to apply common-
law rules.  Robert Burns, Judicial Enforcement of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act’s 
Rulemaking Provisions, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 383, 404 (1979). 
234. See, e.g., Monsanto, 367 N.E.2d at 689 (finding that a decision of Pollution Control 
Board about whether to grant a variance under the Illinois Equal Protection Act was “essentially 
quasi-judicial”); Kalisz v. Ill. Educ. Ass’n, 510 N.E.2d 1103, 1105–06 (Ill. 1987) (“Whether any 
given proceeding by an administrative or executive body is quasi-judicial depends upon the 
powers and duties of the body conducting the proceeding and upon the nature of the proceedings 
themselves.”); cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that administrative agencies can be said to exercise “judicial power, by 
adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have violated their 
rules”). 
235. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14. 
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deemed unconstitutional under Illinois law because they are legislative 
acts (that is, acts that have the “purpose and effect of altering the legal 
rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative 
branch”236) that fail to comply with the enactment requirements of the 
Illinois Constitution.237 
The General Assembly does its work through the passage of 
resolutions and bills.  As new members are advised upon taking office, 
resolutions are “ways of expressing opinions or doing a variety of things 
except enacting laws,” while bills are used to enact laws.238  
Resolutions do no more than express the mood of the legislature.  
Whether adopted by a single house or jointly by both houses, they can 
have no binding legal effect on the rights of any person or body.  
Resolutions are not laws, cannot become laws, and do not have the 
effect of law.  As the Illinois Supreme Court has explained,  
nothing becomes law simply and solely because men who possess the 
legislative power will that it shall be, unless they express their 
determination to that effect in the mode pointed out by the instrument 
which invests them with the power, and under all the forms which that 
instrument has rendered essential.239 
The General Assembly may make laws only by passing bills,240 and 
to be lawful those bills must comply with the enactment requirements 
set forth in sections eight and nine of article four of the constitution.  
Chief among these are the bicameralism and presentment requirements: 
“No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the 
members elected to each House,”241 and “[e]very bill passed by the 
General Assembly shall be presented to the Governor within 30 
 
236. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); see also BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 505–06 
(noting that all legislative veto schemes that do not require presentment to the executive “alter 
existing legal rights or duties by means less than statutory” and are therefore “likely to violate 
most state constitutions because they amount to the enactment of legislation by improper 
means”). 
237. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (holding that once Congress delegates 
rulemaking to an executive agency, the legislature may only control the promulgation of rules 
“indirectly” through the passage of new laws). 
238. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT, PREFACE TO LAWMAKING: LEGISLATORS’ 
INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, chs. 1, 3 (2010).  The houses of the General 
Assembly may also pass motions, which are used to control the internal operations of the House 
and Senate.  Id. 
239. People ex rel. Burritt v. Comm’rs of State Contracts, 11 N.E. 180, 185 (Ill. 1887). 
240. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 2; see also LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT,, supra note 238, 
at chs. 2, 7 (“Laws can be enacted only by bills—not by resolutions or other measures.”). 
241. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 3. 
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calendar days after its passage.”242 
The legislative review scheme currently in place allows the General 
Assembly to exercise legislative power that does not comply with these 
enactment provisions.  Whenever the General Assembly votes by joint 
resolution to permanently suspend an agency rule to which JCAR has 
objected, the legislative body is altering the legal rights and duties of 
those entities that would have been governed by the agency’s rules.  
Because the General Assembly veto would be accomplished by 
resolution rather than by passage of a bill that was presented to the 
Governor for a potential executive veto, the legislative act cannot have 
the force of law.243  Similarly, if JCAR were to object to an agency rule 
and prohibit its implementation, and the General Assembly were 
subsequently to fail to lift JCAR prohibition (thereby making it 
permanent), not only would the legislature have failed to comply with 
the presentment requirement, but it also would have failed to meet the 
bicameralism requirement of the constitution.244 
In addition to failing to comply with the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements, JCAR or General Assembly vetoes of agency 
rulemaking do not satisfy a host of other requirements specified in the 
Illinois Constitution for passage of bills by the legislature.  Some of 
these other requirements include that laws contain an enacting clause,245 
that the final passage of a bill be done by record vote,246 that the bill be 
read by title on three different days in each house, and that it be 
reproduced and placed on the desk of each member.247 
An argument that has been offered against the foregoing analysis is 
that the enactment requirements of the Illinois Constitution are 
nonetheless satisfied because the statutes that created JCAR and 
General Assembly legislative veto regime248 were duly passed by the 
legislature as ordinary bills, with bicameralism, presentment, and all 
other constitutional enactment provisions respected.249  With good 
 
242. Id. art. IV, § 9. 
243. See, e.g., Gen. Assembly of State of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 444 (N.J. 1982); State 
v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 772 (Alaska 1980). 
244. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 3. 
245. “Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General 
Assembly.”  Id. art. IV, § 8, cl. 1. 
246. Id. art. IV, § 8, cl. 3. 
247. Id. art. IV, § 8, cl. 4. 
248. See supra Part I (discussing the General Assembly veto era). 
249. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 40, Caro ex rel. State v. Blagojevich, 895 N.E.2d 
1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (No. 08-1061).  In this brief, which grew out of the same JCAR veto 
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reason, this argument has been roundly rejected when raised in other 
states.250  A legislature should not be allowed to delegate powers to 
itself by statute that it is not constitutionally authorized to possess, even 
with the acquiescence of the governor.251  In Illinois, legislative acts 
must be accomplished through laws that have complied with 
constitutional enactment requirements, and no statute can exempt the 
legislature from these constitutional requirements.252 
Although there are no judicial opinions in Illinois that have addressed 
the constitutionality of JCAR or General Assembly vetoes of agency 
rulemaking,253 the Illinois Supreme Court case of Quinn v. Donnewald 
merits some attention in the context of this discussion.254  At issue in 
 
that led in part to Governor Blagojevich’s impeachment, the Illinois Attorney General argued that 
the legality of legislative vetoes had already been decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in Quinn 
v. Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ill. 1985). 
250. See, e.g., Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 2000); Mo. Coal. for the Env’t 
v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); State ex rel. Stephan v. 
Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984); Legislative Research Comm’n v. 
Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984); State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980). 
251. In the last analysis, it should be for the courts rather than the political branches to 
determine whether there has been a violation of separation-of-powers principles.  Cf. NLRB v. 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2594 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Indeed, the vitality of separation 
of powers “does not depend [on] whether the encroached-upon branch approves the 
encroachment.”  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Com. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 
(2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  As Justice Scalia opined about the 
Chadha case recently in a concurring opinion in NLRB v. Canning, it is no support to the 
argument that the legislative veto is lawful to point out that the executive signed legislation 
authorizing Congress to utilize it.  “Just the opposite: We said the other branches’ enthusiasm for 
the legislative veto ‘sharpened rather than blunted’ our review.”  Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2594. 
252. A.L.I.V.E., 606 P.2d at 777 (“[W]hile the legislature can delegate the power to make laws 
conditionally, the condition must be lawful and may not contain a grant of power to any branch of 
government to function in a manner prohibited by the constitution.”). 
253. There are Illinois court decisions in which a JCAR objection to an agency’s proposed 
regulations is addressed, but those cases do not involve a JCAR or General Assembly veto.  
Rather, the cases involves challenges to rules on the grounds that JCAR objections did not, either 
directly or through General Assembly passage of a joint resolution, lead to the permanent 
suspension of the rules.  See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 644 N.E.2d 817, 
824–25 (Ill. 1994) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that JCAR, once it challenged Illinois 
Commerce Commission regulations, was not allowed to retract its objection before the General 
Assembly could vote to pass a joint resolution making JCAR’s suspension of the regulation 
permanent); S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (same, in the 
context of short-term lending rules promulgated by the Illinois Department of Financial 
Institutions); cf. Reece v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 767 N.E.2d 395, 398–403 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a statutory scheme allowing the General Assembly 
to accept or reject by joint resolution recommendations from the State Board of Education about 
physical education waivers for schools was an unconstitutional variation on a legislative veto, 
because the General Assembly accepted the board’s recommendations and therefore there was no 
legislative veto for the court to consider). 
254. 483 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ill. 1985). 
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Donnewald were salary recommendations made by the Compensation 
Review Board (“CRB”), a body created by the state’s Compensation 
Review Act, for judges, constitutional officers, and members of the 
General Assembly.255  The twelve members of the CRB—private 
citizens appointed in equal numbers by the majority and minority 
leaders of the House and Senate—were required by statute to make their 
salary recommendations in a report.  The recommendations would then 
go into effect unless a majority of each house of the General Assembly 
voted to disapprove the report. 
In Donnewald, the General Assembly failed to pass such a joint 
resolution, and the salaries the CRB recommended went into effect.  
Citing INS v. Chadha, the plaintiffs challenged the salary 
recommendation scheme, arguing it set up a variation of an 
unconstitutional legislative veto.  The Illinois Supreme Court refused to 
address this argument on the ground that the constitutionality of 
legislative vetoes was not properly before it, noting that because the 
General Assembly did not pass a joint resolution disapproving of the 
report, there had been no legislative veto.256 
Nonetheless, there are two reasons the Donnewald decision should 
give pause to anyone who presumes to know how the Illinois Supreme 
Court will rule on the constitutionality of legislative vetoes in the state.  
The first reason for caution concerns another of the plaintiffs’ 
challenges—that the General Assembly had improperly delegated 
legislative power to the CRB by authorizing the board to set salaries for 
government officials.257  The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this 
argument too, in part on the ground that the General Assembly had 
never intended to delegate to the CRB the power to establish salaries in 
the first place.258  Evidence for this conclusion was that the legislature 
had retained for itself the power to reject the CRB’s recommendations 
through possible passage of a joint resolution.  The implication of the 
court’s observation was that a General Assembly joint resolution veto of 
CRB salary recommendations would have legal effect.  This implication 
sits uncomfortably with the prospect that such legislative vetoes are 
nonetheless unconstitutional. 
The other aspect of Donnewald that should give pause is the Illinois 
 
255. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1-6.3 (2016). 
256. Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d at 222. 
257. Id. at 221. 
258. Id. at 220. 
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Supreme Court’s response to the plaintiffs’ argument that the whole 
CRB scheme was unconstitutional because it allowed salaries to be set 
in a manner that did not accord with the state constitution’s 
bicameralism and presentment requirements.259  The court rejected this 
argument as well, observing that the Compensation Review Act itself 
was passed in conformance with bicameralism and presentment 
requirements.  This rationale superficially lends support to the 
suggestion that the exercise of legislative vetoes is permissible so long 
as the statute that created the legislative veto schemes was itself passed 
in accord with constitutional enactment requirements.  In fact, the 
Illinois Attorney General cited Donnewald as precedent for precisely 
this point in briefing for the Caro v. Blagojevich case, in which it 
initially appeared that the Illinois courts would have to decide whether 
the Governor could lawfully order his administrative agencies to ignore 
suspension orders from JCAR and the General Assembly.260 
The reasoning in Donnewald, however, does not bear the weight the 
Attorney General placed on it in her briefing in Caro.  As noted above, 
the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly stated in its opinion that it was not 
reaching the legislative veto question.261  This is important, because the 
court’s reasoning about constitutional enactment issues was not 
addressed to activity by the General Assembly or one of its legislative 
committees.  The activity the court considered was the issuance of the 
salary report by the CRB.  As a committee of private citizens, the CRB 
may be delegated quasi-legislative powers, but—just like an 
administrative agency—need not itself act in conformance with 
constitutional lawmaking requirements because the committee is not 
comprised of legislators.  The only other activity that was properly 
before the court was the conduct of the General Assembly in passing the 
legislation that created the CRB (which, as the court noted, was done in 
accord with bicameralism and presentment requirements) and in failing 
to pass a joint resolution to kill the CRB’s salary recommendations 
(which, as the court again noted, was a failure to act rather than an act).  
In short, the Donnewald decision tells us vanishingly little about how 
the Illinois Supreme Court will rule on the question of the 
constitutionality of legislative vetoes in the state. 
 
259. Id. at 222. 
260. See Brief for Intervenor the State of Illinois at 9, Caro ex rel. State v. Blagojevich, 895 
N.E.2d 1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (No. 08-1061). 
261. Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d at 222. 
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C.  The Importance of House Bill 398 
As noted above, the first real test of the legitimacy of JCAR and 
General Assembly vetoes came after Governor Rod Blagojevich 
characterized JCAR activity as advisory only, and directed his 
Department of Health and Family Services to ignore a JCAR 
prohibition of its proposed rules about Medicaid eligibility—which led 
to lawsuits, articles of impeachment, and eventual removal of the 
Governor from office in 2009.262  Although the courts did not rule on 
the constitutionality of the legislative veto, the General Assembly surely 
understood that the aftermath of the Governor’s removal was a 
propitious time for shoring up its legislative veto scheme. 
The body did so by passing House Bill 398 in February 2009, just 
one month after Blagojevich was removed from office.  The bill, which 
was signed into law by the new Governor, Patrick Quinn, states that 
“[a]ll rulemaking authority” exercised after the IAPA’s effective date 
“is conditioned on the rules being adopted in accordance with all 
provisions of this Act and all rules and procedures of the Joint 
Committee on Administrative Rules (JCAR).”263  In case the import of 
this first part is unclear, the IAPA goes on to state that “any purported 
rule not so adopted, for whatever reason, including without limitation a 
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction holding any part of this Act 
or the rules or procedures of JCAR invalid, is unauthorized.”264 
It is understandable that the General Assembly wanted desperately to 
maintain supervisory powers over administrative agency rulemaking.265  
But House Bill 398 was a risky bit of legislation.  By its plain terms, it 
declared all agency rules to be of no effect if they were not subjected to 
review and a potential veto by JCAR or the General Assembly, even if 
the courts had ruled those procedures to be unlawful.266  By passing this 
 
262. Act of Feb. 26, 2009, Pub. Act. 96-002. 
263. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-6 (2016). 
264. Id. 
265. During the House debate, Representative Hannig said that House Bill 398 was “one of 
the most important Bills that we’ll deal with in this Legislative Session.  This deal[s] with the 
very essence of the Legislative Branch.”  H.R., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen. Assemb., 8th 
Sess., at 20 (Ill. Feb. 5, 2009) (statement of Rep. Hannig); see also id. at 20 (statement of Rep. 
Leitch) (“Whether you recognize it or not, . . . this is one of the most important Bills that we will 
ever have come before us.”). 
266. Senator Clayborne described the measure as an act “to require an administrative agency 
seeking to promulgate rules to adhere to the rules and procedures of JCAR even if a court finds, 
for example, JCAR’s power to suspend rules is unconstitutional.”  S., Transcript of Debates, 96th 
Gen. Assemb., 13th Sess., at 11 (Ill. Feb. 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. Clayborne).  When asked 
whether this provision meant that if rules were promulgated that had not gone “before the Joint 
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legislation, the members of the General Assembly seem to have been 
betting that the courts would be dissuaded from doing so, because the 
consequences of such a ruling might be cataclysmic.  In a word, the 
combined effect of House Bill 398 and a ruling that the JCAR veto 
scheme was unconstitutional would be to bring to a complete stop all 
future agency rulemaking, because no rule could ever comply with all 
of JCAR procedures if those procedures are disallowed by the courts.  
House Bill 398 is, in a word, a species of doomsday legislation. 
It is certainly possible that legislators in the General Assembly did 
not understand the effect that House Bill 398 might have on the 
prospects of agency rulemaking if the Illinois courts were to rule that 
legislative vetoes are unconstitutional.  The floor debates about the 
measure do not evidence a nuanced understanding of the constitutional 
issues raised by JCAR and General Assembly vetoes, and instead 
suggest that the legislators were under the impression that House Bill 
398 would do no more than clarify that the General Assembly wanted 
JCAR review of agency rulemaking to be mandatory rather than merely 
advisory.267  For example, Representative Leitch stated that the measure 
simply  
clarifies a long-standing issue . . . [of tension between the Executive 
and Legislative Branches] and establishes without any question or 
confusion the rights of this Legislative Body to prohibit rulemaking by 
the Executive Branch that does not comport with the legislative intent 
of measures that have been passed here in this General Assembly.268 
The impression left from the debate was that the legislature, incensed 
by Governor Blagojevich’s allegedly willful misunderstanding of 
JCAR’s statutory authority, passed House Bill 398 simply to make it 
clear that JCAR had statutorily sanctioned coercive powers over 
administrative agencies.269 
 
Committee, that they would be determined to be illegal or inappropriate and not applicable,” id. at 
12 (statement of Sen. Rutherford), his answer was that the observation was correct, id. at 12 
(statement of Sen. Clayborne). 
267. See H.R., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen. Assemb., 8th Sess., at 13 (Ill. Feb. 5, 2009) 
(statement of Rep. Hannig) (“The former Governor filed a lawsuit and he argues in the courts that 
JCAR is advisory.”); id. (stement of Rep. Bost) (“I think it’s a shame that we’ve had to go down 
this path where there was no question before by any statewide elected official or any Member of 
this chamber or the other chambers in all the years that JCAR has been in existence of what their 
importance is.”). 
268. Id. at 18 (statement of Rep. Leitch). 
269. How, some senators wanted to know, was this legislation supposed to function?  “I read,” 
said Senator Rutherford, “that if rules are promulgated and a court finds that the Administrative 
Code or the Joint Committee [is] invalid—help me understand the logic how this statute could 
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Nonetheless, the text of House Bill 398 does more than clarify the 
General Assembly’s intent to give JCAR review some teeth.  It is 
fashioned in the manner of nonseverability legislation, so that agency 
rulemaking will be brought to a halt if the legislative veto provisions of 
the IAPA are eventually ruled unconstitutional.  Even so, the Illinois 
courts should not let legislative threats of self-harm affect their analysis 
of the constitutionality of legislative vetoes over agency rulemaking.  
House Bill 398 adds nothing to the calculus of whether, for example, 
the exercise of legislative vetoes is an unconstitutional attempt to wield 
legislative power without meeting the constitutional bicameralism and 
presentment requirements.  Nor, for that matter, does House Bill 398 
make it less likely that the JCAR legislative veto scheme represents an 
unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial power to declare what the 
law is.270 
The suspension of a system that allows the legislature to delegate 
rulemaking authority to agencies would be a self-inflicted wound that 
the General Assembly could easily cure by the statutory repeal of House 
Bill 398. 
V.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
This Article has argued that in time the Illinois courts will strike 
down as unconstitutional JCAR and General Assembly veto provisions 
of the Illinois Administrative Procedures Act.  When and if that 
happens, the state will be left with the question of what, if anything, 
should replace the current system of legislative review of agency 
rulemaking.  This Part will briefly canvas some alternatives to the 
legislative veto that would survive constitutional scrutiny. 
There are compelling reasons to assure that the General Assembly 
has meaningful oversight of administrative agency rulemaking.  
Agencies do in fact sometimes act beyond their statutory authority when 
promulgating rules, and they sometimes issue unwise rules that are 
 
still have those rules continue to have the force of law.” S., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen. 
Assemb., 13th Sess., at 12 (Ill. Feb. 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. Rutherford).  Senator 
Clayborne’s response was, “I assume that because this is voluntary, that maybe the court will 
view this a little differently and say that the agency had the ability either not to promulgate rules 
or to promulgate rules, and when they decide to promulgate rules, then they decide to abide by 
our existing rules.”  Id. at 12 (statement of Sen. Clayborne); see also id. (“[T]his is voluntary.  I 
mean, they can volunteer not to promulgate rules, but if they decide to promulgate rules, then 
they’ll abide by the rules of JCAR.”). 
270. Indeed, if anything, it would have the effect of making it more likely that the legislative 
veto scheme is a separation-of-powers problem.  See infra Part II.A. 
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arguably contrary to the public health, welfare, and safety.  Although in 
an ideal world the solution to agency overreach and insipience would be 
to keep the rulemaking business in the hands of our democratically 
elected representatives in the legislature, the reality of the modern 
administrative states makes this option untenable.  There are too many 
subjects requiring too much expertise to make it feasible for legislators 
to draft rules with sufficient specificity and in sufficient numbers to 
effectuate the underlying purposes of their legislation.271 
There is no real possibility that the General Assembly will leave 
unused its power to delegate rulemaking authority to administrative 
agencies.272  The question then remains—what kind of legislative 
oversight of the agencies’ rulemaking activities would both comport 
with constitutional requirements and represent good policy? 
A first option is very straightforward.  If the legislative veto—as 
exercised either by the General Assembly or by JCAR—is 
unconstitutional, then simply amend the Illinois Constitution to allow 
for legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking.  Such a course of action 
may or may not be wise, but there is a procedure for amending the 
Illinois Constitution, and an amendment would provide a clean 
resolution to the kinds of constitutional questions raised in this 
Article.273  A similar amendment strategy has been used elsewhere, 
including in Iowa,274 Connecticut,275 Nevada,276 South Carolina,277 and 
New Jersey.278 
 
271. Each year administrative agencies in Illinois produce about 20,000 pages of rules.  H.R., 
Transcript of Debates, 95th Gen. Assemb., 299th Sess. (Ill. Jan. 8, 2009) (statement of Andrew P. 
Morriss, Professor, Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign), http://www.ilga.gov/house/committees/ 
95Documents/Committee%20Exhibit%2050.pdf. 
272. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-5 (2016). 
273. There are three ways to amend the Illinois Constitution.  The first is through a 
constitutional convention, ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1, the second is through a legislatively referred 
constitutional amendment, id. art. XIV, § 2, and the last (for amendments to article IV of the 
constitution only, relating to structural and procedural subjects concerning the General Assembly) 
is through an initiated constitutional amendment, id. art. XIV, § 3. 
274. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 40 (allowing legislature to stop implementation of agency rule by 
joint resolution). 
275. CONN. CONST. art. 2 (allowing agency rules to be blocked by legislature or a committee 
of the legislature as prescribed by law); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-170, 4-171 (2015). 
276. NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (allowing the legislature to nullify agency rules by majority vote 
of both houses). 
277. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 18 (allowing joint resolutions to have the effect of law); Letter 
from Edwin E. Evans, Deputy Attorney Gen. of S.C., to Edwin E. Bowen, Jr., 1986 S.C. Op. 
Atty. Gen. No. 86-76, 1986 WL 192034 (July 8, 1986) (concluding that the legislative veto 
process of agency rulemaking was constitutional due to the passage of section 18 of article III). 
278. N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 4, ¶ 6 (allowing the legislature to stop implementation of agency 
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Whether amending the constitution to allow a legislative veto of 
agency rulemaking would be a good idea is a different question.  There 
are strong arguments in support of legislative vetoes, not least Justice 
White’s observation in his dissent in Chadha that it is the only practical 
way for a legislature to oversee the important power that it must entrust 
to the executive branch.279  Arguments have also been advanced that 
agency oversight via legislative veto retains democratic legitimacy (by 
allowing the General Assembly to have the final word on rulemaking 
powers that are essentially legislative in nature), promotes political 
accountability (by leaving final responsibility for rules in the hands of 
elected legislators), and leaves policy decisions where they belong, with 
elected representatives of the people rather than unelected appointees of 
the governor.280  Legislatures are accountable to the public, arguably 
know best the nature of the authority they delegated to the agencies, and 
are able to efficiently give feedback to the agencies if they are 
authorized to wield veto power.281 
On the other side of the ledger, schemes allowing for legislative 
vetoes of agency rulemaking have been widely critiqued, including 
most comprehensively by Arthur Earl Bonfield in his classic State 
Administrative Rule Making.282  Among the objections that Bonfield 
notes (and that have not already been discussed in this Article) are the 
following: Legislative vetoes might unduly strengthen the legislature’s 
authority over the executive by removing the governor’s constitutional 
veto power and weakening his bargaining position.283  Special interest 
 
rules through passage of a joint resolution). 
279. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 999 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
280. H.R., Transcript of Debates, 95th Gen. Assemb., 299th Sess. (Ill. Jan. 8, 2009) (statement 
of Andrew P. Morriss, Professor, Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign), http://www.ilga.gov/house/ 
committees/95Documents/Committee%20Exhibit%2050.pdf. 
281. See Jerry L. Anderson & Christopher Poyner, A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of 
Iowa’s Administrative Rules Review Committee Procedure, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 27 (2012).  
There is a voluminous literature on policy issues surrounding the legislative veto.  See Frickey, 
supra note 151, at 1259 n.93. 
282. BONFIELD, supra note 189; see also Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State 
Administrative Rulemaking Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (1991) (offering similar 
arguments and observations). 
283. BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 507; see also Gen. Assembly of State of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 
A.2d 438, 444 (N.J. 1982) (“Broad legislative veto power deters executive agencies in the 
performance of their constitutional duty to enforce existing laws.  Its vice lies not only in its 
exercise but in its very existence.  Faced with potential paralysis from repeated uses of the veto 
that disrupt coherent regulatory schemes, officials may retreat from the execution of their 
responsibilities.  They will resort to compromises with legislative committees aimed at drafting 
rules that the current Legislature will find acceptable.”). 
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groups will be more likely to exercise undue influence over legislative 
committees that have veto power over agency rulemaking.284  Agencies 
that draft rules in the shadow of legislative vetoes may end up more 
influenced by legislators than by the public rulemaking process.285  The 
public might be misled about who is ultimately responsible for rules that 
are promulgated by agencies but that require legislative approval.286  
Allowing a small committee to exercise a veto creates the likelihood 
that a small number of legislators will “effectively subvert” the will of 
the entire legislative body.287  Legislators may be lulled into making 
overly broad delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies out of a 
“false sense of security” that the legislature will be able to adequately 
oversee the rules that are actually promulgated.288  The failure to veto a 
rule might have the unanticipated consequence of convincing the courts 
(“consciously or unconsciously”) that the legislature deemed the agency 
rule to be lawfully promulgated.289  And finally, too many “hurdles” to 
rulemaking might encourage agencies to eschew rulemaking altogether 
“in favor of law making by ad hoc adjudication.”290 
 
284. A committee or legislative veto of rules “may be more susceptible to undue influence by 
special interest groups seeking action inconsistent with the political will of the entire body politic 
and contrary to the public interest, than is a veto . . . by the usual statutory enactment process 
involving both houses and the governor.”  BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 508.  A pre-Chadha 
study conducted in the 1980s by Marcus E. Ethridge found that states with legislative review 
schemes over agency action led to “probable changes in the substance of public policies” adopted 
by the agencies because of the legislative oversight, and that “potential political influence is an 
important determinant of committee action.”  Marcus E. Ethridge, Consequences of Legislative 
Review of Agency Regulations in Three U.S. States, 9 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 161, 175 (1984). 
285. The legislative veto may have the unintended consequence of “inducing administrators to 
develop rules primarily or exclusively on the basis of contacts with legislators rather than on the 
basis of public rule-making proceedings.”  BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 509. 
286. Vesting a veto over agency rules in the legislative branch may create a false impression 
with the public that the legislature is responsible for the “legality and desirability of all rules of 
all agencies.”  Id. at 510. 
287. Id. at 510–11.  This is a concern that is somewhat mitigated by the availability in Illinois 
of a General Assembly joint resolution override of the JCAR veto.  But even so, the committee or 
full legislative veto would in at least some instances potentially be overriding the will of an 
earlier General Assembly that had passed the original authorizing legislation. 
288. Id. at 512. 
289. Id. at 513.  In Illinois, the courts typically do not find probative the failure of the General 
Assembly to pass legislation.  See S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002) (“[L]egislative inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable 
inferences may be drawn from such inaction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 540 
(“The legislature can not express its will by a failure to legislate.  The act of refusing to enact a 
law . . . has utterly no legal effect, and thus has utterly no place in a serious discussion of the 
law.” (internal quotation makes and citation omitted)). Whether the courts would view the failure 
of the General Assembly to pass a veto by joint resolution remains a matter of speculation. 
290. BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 513. 
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Bonfield’s observations about potential drawbacks to legislative veto 
schemes merit serious reflection, and might on their own reasonably 
dissuade a legislature from seeking to establish the legislative veto if 
none had previously existed in law.  Illinois, though, has more than 
three decades’ worth of experience with various types of legislative 
vetoes of agency rulemaking.  Therefore, empirical and qualitative 
analysis of the manner in which the state’s legislative veto scheme has 
or has not been successful—with special attention to the problems that 
Bonfield suggests might come about—would be of value before a 
constitutional amendment is pursued.291  Of particular interest is 
whether JCAR vetoes have historically been issued because of policy 
disagreements with agencies or because the agencies truly appear to 
have acted beyond their statutory authority.292 
Of course, there are other ways that JCAR could perform an 
important oversight function without being given veto power or 
requiring amendment to the constitution.  Many of these alternatives 
were in fact offered for consideration by JCAR itself in its early years, 
when the committee pondered ways to supplement its initial inform-
and-advise powers.293  Among the least controversial was JCAR’s 
suggestion that agencies should be required to consider the economic 
impact of their proposed rules, and that JCAR review could be 
expanded to include economic considerations.294  An expansion of 
review authority along these lines would of course raise no 
constitutional issues. 
Another promising proposal that would probably survive 
constitutional scrutiny would be to shift the burden of proof to the 
agency in any court challenge of a rule to which JCAR had objected.295 
Although it might be challenged as an unconstitutional encroachment on 
the powers of the judicial branch, the constitutionality of such burden 
shifting has been upheld in other states296 and is recommended by the 
 
291. For a study addressing some of these issues, see generally Marc D. Falkoff, An Empirical 
Critique of JCAR and the Legislative Veto in Illinois, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming spring 
2016). 
292. See Carl A. Auerbach, Bonfield on State Administrative Rulemaking: A Critique, 71 
MINN. L. REV. 543, 568 (1987) (chief critic of Bonfield nonetheless agreeing “that the committee 
should not be given authority to object to an agency rule on policy grounds”). 
293. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 393–96. 
294. Id. at 393. 
295. Id. at 393–94. 
296. See, e.g., Iowa Dealers Ass’n v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1981). 
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drafters of the Model State Administrative Procedures Act.297  One 
benefit of such a proposal would be that the view of the current 
legislature (or at least of a legislative committee) would be known to the 
court and might have some marginal effect on its determination of 
whether an agency is or is not acting beyond its authority.  Likewise, 
there might be some deterrent effect on agencies, though an agency’s 
certainty that it is acting within its authority would presumably prevent 
it from being dissuaded from placing the regulation into effect.298 
CONCLUSION 
Eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court will rule on the 
constitutionality of JCAR and legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking.  
When that day arrives, the court will almost surely conclude, in accord 
with the courts in nearly every jurisdiction to have addressed the same 
question, that the legislative veto violates the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements of the state constitution.  In the meantime, to 
avoid the chaos that might follow such a ruling, the General Assembly 
should consider alternatives to the legislative veto that will be more 
likely to survive constitutional scrutiny while still providing meaningful 
legislative oversight of agency rulemaking. 
 
297. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 3-204 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1981). 
298. Some of the other proposals from the 1979 report would, like the legislative veto 
provision that has been discussed in this Article, also be of dubious lawfulness.  For example, the 
proposal to allow JCAR to require agency rulemaking would, as JCAR itself acknowledged, 
raises “[v]ery serious constitutional questions.”  1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 396.  
Because JCAR could force the agency to adopt whatever rules JCAR wanted, the agency and any 
statutory delegation of rulemaking authority to the agency would be illusory and political lines of 
accountability would be entirely obscured.  Other problematic proposals include those that would 
allow for non-permanent action by JCAR, such as the temporary suspension of existing rules, the 
suspension of emergency rules, and a pre-approval requirement for new permanent and 
emergency rules before they could become effective.  Finally, a related proposal would give 
JCAR some coercive power beyond merely recommending to the General Assembly the passage 
of corrective legislation would be to authorize JCAR to initiate lawsuits against agencies deemed 
to have acted beyond their statutory authority.  Id. 
